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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the shocking, headline-grabbing revelations of 
clergy sexual abuse within some religious institutions, the judiciary has 
examined a number of critical, previously unaddressed, issues in tort 
law.1  These issues stem principally from the scope of duty, if any, owed 
by a church as an institution to its members, and the responsibility, if 
any, of the religious institution for the conduct of personnel within its 
ranks.2  Courts, perhaps surprisingly, have declined to answer many of 
these basic questions through any hard rules, choosing instead to apply a 
more surgical approach3 to precise duty issues or avoid the issue 
entirely.  A major reason courts continue to tread so carefully is that the 
 
 1. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions 
to Protect Others: Surgical Instruments, Not Machetes, Are Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 11 (2005). 
 2. See infra Part IV. 
 3. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1, at 13. 
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First Amendment creates a zone of autonomy for religious institutions 
where the application of tort law, and particularly duty principles, must 
avoid abridging the free exercise of religion or entangling church and 
state.4  This constitutional zone of freedom is embodied in what 
academics have called the doctrine of ―church autonomy,‖5 the subject 
of this Article. 
Over the past half century, the importance of church autonomy with 
respect to the application of tort law principles has increased 
substantially.  Prior to this period, religious institutions were generally 
immune from tort liability, creating little need to probe the contours of 
tort law and draw duty lines for churches.6  When this immunity was 
removed, it left a fresh canvas.  One of the few guideposts for courts, 
both then and now, for fashioning clear, consistent, and fair liability 
rules is the notion that tort law should refrain from interfering in the 
practices or tenets of a religion, or ―second-guessing‖ the faith-based 
decisions of religious institutions regarding internal ecclesiastical 
affairs.7  While the criminal actions of a few errant clerics have brought 
the application of tort law to religious institutions into the public eye, 
and placed at stake potentially billions of dollars in liability,8 that 
application affects a much broader range of interests, such as how 
religious institutions of any size will carry out their daily activities and 
core mission. 
It is in this vein that this Article examines the application of the 
church autonomy doctrine to tort actions involving religious institutions.  
The Article serves as a guide for courts in developing clear liability rules 
for where tort law should step aside and not intrude upon what are 
ultimately faith-based practices, policies, and judgments. 
Part II begins by analyzing the fundamental reasons why, from both a 
practical and constitutional standpoint, religious institutions are and 
should be treated differently under the law from other entities, such as a 
business.  Part II further explains how these differences, protected by the 
First Amendment religion clauses, became embodied in the doctrine of 
church autonomy.  Part III then examines how distinct liability rules 
 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). 
 6. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ‘S TORTS 661 n.1 (12th ed. 
2010).  Charitable immunity originated in England in 1846 and was followed in all but two or three 
American courts up until 1942.  See id. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See, e.g., Lara Takenaga, Man Sues Seventh-Day Adventist Church for $5.25 Million, Alleges 
Sex Abuse, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 24, 2011; Rachel Zoll, Sex Abuse Costs U.S. Catholic Church More 
Than $1 Billion, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 10, 2005, at 5; Adam Liptak, Scandals in the Church: The 
Liability, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at A20. 
3
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respecting church autonomy fit within the larger context of tort law and 
are analogous to other areas where tort law steps aside in favor of 
constitutional considerations.  Finally, Part IV discusses the current 
intersection of the church autonomy doctrine and tort law, namely, tort 
claims that are clearly barred by the church autonomy doctrine, claims 
that should be barred but where application of the doctrine is less clear, 
how some claims can be adjudicated while respecting church autonomy, 
and newer claims that strike at the very heart of the church autonomy 
doctrine and where those claims may be headed in the future. 
The Article concludes that the church autonomy doctrine is an 
essential element in the development of sound and consistent tort 
liability rules for religious institutions.  It further suggests that the 
doctrine has been underutilized in helping resolve thorny legal issues 
under a variety of tort theories.  The Article shows how the doctrine can 
and should be effectively employed by courts to reach constitutionally-
permissible and consistent outcomes, and provide notice to religious 
institutions of the level and type of conduct that will result in tort 
liability. 
II. THE COMPELLING IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING CHURCH AUTONOMY 
A. Why the Law Can, Does, and Should Treat Religious Institutions 
Differently 
1. The Unique Nature, Purpose, and History of Religious Institutions in 
America 
Tort law carefully focuses on the unique facts in each personal injury 
case—factual differences determine whether duties are owed and 
liability is proper.  Any consideration of tort claims against a religious 
institution, therefore, must begin not only with the recognition that the 
First Amendment provides special protection to religion, but also with 
the understanding that, as a factual matter, churches and faith 
communities differ fundamentally from secular institutions.  Churches 
and faith communities possess institutional histories, beliefs, traditions, 
and forms of internal governance that often predate the American 
Revolution.9  They are distinctive too, in that religious conviction was a 
primary motivation for American colonization,10 and early settlers 
 
 9. See, e.g., DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION 3-153 (2003) (comparing 16th 
century Catholic theology and church governance with the then-emerging theology of Martin Luther). 
 10. See PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 115 (1956) (―When the English 
undertook to plant colonies in America, they commenced—whatever they ended with—not with 
propositions about the rights of man or with the gospel of wealth, but with absolute certainties 
4
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shared to a remarkable degree a view of America as ―a special place in 
God‘s providential design.‖11 
Faith communities are uniquely characterized by ultimate concerns 
and, typically, by organizations intended to be enduring.12  Ultimate 
concerns include the meaning of life, death, sin, the significance of 
human relationships, and the reconciliation of individuals with God.  
Religious organizations make demands that shape the core of their 
members‘ lives.  Observance of holy days, sacraments and ordinances, 
public worship, private devotion, the education of children, standards of 
personal cleanliness and morality, monetary obligations, and special 
diets—all of these may form the daily practices of people whose 
religious convictions so prompt them.  That religion has to do with 
ultimate concerns explains why the First Amendment speaks of 
―religion,‖ not ―conscience‖ or ―opinion‖ or ―belief.‖13 
Ultimate concerns distinguish religious organizations from other 
organizations, even those that perform the most admirable and useful 
services for humanity.  Unlike government, businesses, social clubs, or 
charitable organizations, religious organizations hold the ―capacity to 
transform mundane aspects of everyday secular existence, infusing them 
with meaning and transcendent significance.‖14  Their unique access to 
the transcendent gives religious organizations different frames of 
reference.  For them, understanding and judgment depend on individual 
faith and conscience, scripture, inspiration, tradition, or recognized 
leadership; secular logic and values frequently have less purchase than 
these elements, if they are viewed as persuasive on matters of religion at 
all. 
Even the extent to which a religious organization‘s members interact 
with the larger world can be a matter of individual conviction or 
established tradition.  Religious belief systems as disparate as 
 
concerning the providence of God.‖). 
 11. J.H. ELLIOTT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD: BRITAIN AND SPAIN IN AMERICA 1492–
1830, at 184 (2006); see also 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 56 (2010) (Eduardo 
Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2010) (explaining that at least one early historian 
viewed the Pilgrims who colonized Massachusetts as ―the seed of a great people that God comes to set 
down with his own hands in a predestined land‖). 
 12. See Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1082, 
1087 (1978) (proposing a bifurcated definition of religion for the First Amendment that looks to ―an 
ultimate concern . . . not limitable by official action‖ and ―organization, theology, and attitudinal 
conformity‖ when interpreting the Establishment Clause). 
 13. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1496 (1990) (―The textual insistence on the special status of 
‗religion‘ is, moreover, rooted in the prevailing understandings, both religious and philosophical, of the 
difference between religious faith and other forms of human judgment.‖). 
 14. W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism, and the 
Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 BYU L. REV. 421, 426 (1993). 
5
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Christianity and Buddhism have prompted the creation of hermetic 
clerical orders while supporting interaction of other members with each 
other and with outsiders.  Interaction may be partial, as illustrated by the 
demand of intrafaith marriage in orthodox Jewish congregations and 
certain Christian and Islamic communities.  Community service is also a 
significant requirement of some faiths.  Soup kitchens, hospitals, 
adoption agencies, and other social services are provided by many 
religious groups, often at a substantial sacrifice15—a pattern of giving 
that has characterized American churches since colonial days.16 
These outcomes—some life-defining to particular religious adherents, 
others producing profound social goods—are the product of 
organizations that are especially vulnerable to the coercive forces of 
law.  Churches have an existence that transcends the law in the sense 
that they ―preexisted the state, are transnational, and would continue to 
exist if the state were suddenly dissolved or destroyed.‖17  Preserving 
churches‘ institutional integrity, which is often calibrated to values not 
shared by the legal system or society generally, requires a sensitive 
appreciation of how legal requirements may affect them.  Justices of the 
Supreme Court have noted, ―religious activity derives meaning in large 
measure from participation in a larger religious community.  Such a 
community represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic 
entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals.‖18  Autonomy 
for such communities to define themselves, their commitments, and 
their membership lies at the heart of what America knows as religious 
liberty.19  At a minimum, religious organizations must retain the 
freedom to ―‘select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve 
their own disputes, and run their own institutions.‘‖20  Litigation, actual 
or threatened, against a religious organization carries the possibility of 
 
 15. See Ram Cnaan, Our Hidden Safety Net: Social Community Work, 17 BROOKINGS REV. 50, 
51, 53 (1999) (reporting that in a study of 113 religious organizations in Chicago, New York City, 
Indianapolis, Mobile, Philadelphia, and San Francisco each organization donated an average of 
$140,000 per year in money, goods, and services to programs designed to care for their communities‘ 
needs). 
 16. See id. at 50 (―From colonial times, religious congregations and religious organizations in the 
United States have been providing not only for the spiritual needs of their congregants and communities, 
but for their social welfare as well.‖). 
 17. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental 
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 55 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
 18. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 19. See id. (―Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization‘s religious 
mission, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by which a 
religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church‘s ability to do so reflects the idea that 
furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as 
well.‖). 
 20. Id. at 341–42 (quoting Laycock, supra note 5, at 1389). 
6
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distorting a faith community‘s ―process of self-definition,‖ thereby 
posing ―the danger of chilling religious activity.‖21  To avoid that 
danger, ―[r]eligious organizations need to be given space and sensitive 
protection if they are to make the generative and regenerative 
contribution to social life that they (and in many respects, they alone) 
can make.‖22 
2. How the Law Has Long Treated Churches Differently 
It should come as no surprise that a delicate touch is required when 
setting the bounds of tort law with respect to religious organizations.  
American law already affords religious organizations different treatment 
in a number of ways.  Religious organizations, for instance, may be 
exempt from the national income tax23 and may qualify for deductible 
donations.24  Bankruptcy law affords special protection for debtors who 
make charitable donations to religious institutions.25  Such institutions 
are also exempt from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act regarding 
claims of religious discrimination.26  Courts have construed federal anti-
discrimination laws to require a ―ministerial exemption,‖ under which 
the statute‘s anti-discrimination mandate does not apply to church 
employees who qualify as ministers.27  Constitutional principles have 
likewise influenced courts and legislators to preclude the National Labor 
Relations Board from interfering with the internal management of 
religious schools;28 to uphold statutory rules exempting religious 
 
 21. Id. at 343–44 (citation omitted). 
 22. Durham & Dushku, supra note 14, at 426. 
 23. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West 2010). 
 24. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 170 (West 2010) (noting that section 126(c)(2)(B) speaks to election of 
certain cost-sharing payments, whereas section 170 speaks to charitable, contributions, gifts, etc.). 
 25. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707 (West 2010) (prohibiting a court from considering on a motion to 
dismiss ―whether a debtor has made, or continues to make, charitable contributions . . . to any qualified 
religious or charitable entity or organization . . . .‖). 
 26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(e)(2) (2006). 
 27. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp‘t Opportunity 
Comm‘n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (affirming that the First Amendment requires a ministerial exception to 
otherwise generally-applicable statutes and applying that exception to dismiss claims under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act by a ―called‖ teacher of primarily secular subjects against her religious 
school); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 903 
(2007) (dismissing a female chaplain‘s Title VII claims for gender discrimination and retaliation for 
opposing sexual harassment against a private Catholic university because the decision to restructure 
university leadership and demote her fell within the ministerial exception); Bryce v. Episcopal Church 
in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting the ministerial exception to Title VII 
employment discrimination cases arises from the constitutional principle of church autonomy: ―The 
right to choose ministers is an important part of internal church governance and can be essential to the 
well-being of a church.‖). 
 28. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979). 
7
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organizations from state property taxes;29 to exempt from military 
service clergy, theology students,30 and those with religious-based 
objections to war;31 and to approve release time for students to attend 
religious exercises off public school property.32 
In addition, the U.S. Congress has enacted two statutes for the 
purpose of safeguarding religious freedom.  The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)33 subjects any federal law that burdens 
religious practice to heightened scrutiny, and the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)34 imposes strict 
scrutiny in the context of land use regulations affecting houses of 
worship and regulations affecting the religious exercise of prisoners.  
These are but a few of the numerous special accommodations that the 
law affords religion. 
One of American law‘s most singular differences in the treatment of 
religious organizations, however, is long gone.  Charitable immunity, 
which protected religious institutions from tort claims for a century,35 
began to give way in the 1940s when courts determined that the greater 
availability of liability insurance provided a reasonable means for 
churches to make third parties whole from slip-and-fall injuries and 
other simple torts.36  This end to charitable immunity was later 
enshrined in the ―black letter‖ of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,37 
and there has been no argument among courts or legal scholars for the 
doctrine‘s return. 
Charitable immunity reflected an era when religious organizations 
and other charities enjoyed greater public respect and private insurance 
was rare or difficult to acquire.38  Its repeal was a sea change in the law 
that brought unanticipated consequences.  Unconsidered at the time was 
whether and how religious organizations would face more complex tort 
claims, such as vicarious liability or breach of fiduciary duty claims for 
the wrongful acts of clergy or church members, and the effect such 
claims would have on a faith community‘s autonomy and religious 
exercise. 
Today, such claims against religious organizations are increasingly 
 
 29. See Walz v. Tax Comm‘n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 30. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
 31. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
 32. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. 
 35. See supra note 5. 
 36. See, e.g., President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 823–24 (D.C. Cir. 
1942); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary‘s, 446 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo. 1969). 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979). 
 38. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1, at 14–18. 
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common.39  Cultural trends associated with this increase include a 
diminished reluctance to bring litigation against religious institutions, 
―perhaps because churches and clergy no longer stand in the same 
revered position vis-à-vis parishioners or because the availability of 
insurance makes suing one‘s church a less unpalatable undertaking.‖40  
Another associated trend is the ―seemingly disproportionate media 
attention given to alleged misconduct by clergy and their institutions.‖41  
Some have suggested that increased respect for tort victims, coupled 
with a diminished respect for established institutions, is particularly 
significant: 
We live, it would seem, in an era of heightened sensitivity to those who 
claim injury or some other victimlike status, and our chosen means of 
redress for alleged past harm is compensation, achieved by holding the 
tortfeasor monetarily liable.  At the same time, we appear to live in an era 
in which many institutions—including religious institutions—command 
diminished respect and in which their authority is often greeted with 
skepticism.  Together, these two cultural trends make it especially 
difficult for one to persuasively insist, on constitutional grounds or 
otherwise, that religious institutions ought to be effectively shielded from 
the claims of their tort victims.
42
 
The net result of increased litigation is to ―desensitize judges, juries, 
and other potential litigants to the acceptability of religious entities as 
defendants.‖43  Associated cultural trends mean that ―the public and the 
media appear generally to undervalue, if not altogether overlook, the 
First Amendment issues at stake in the adjudication of tort actions 
against religious defendants.‖44  Properly adjudicating such actions 
requires a correct understanding of the constitutional issues inevitably at 
stake when a tort action is brought against a religious organization or its 
clergy.  Accordingly, the next subpart will discuss the text and original 
understanding of the First Amendment religion clauses, including a 
discussion of the origins and contours of the church autonomy doctrine. 
 
 39. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional 
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 240–41 (2000). 
 40. Id. at 241 (footnotes omitted). 
 41. Id. at 241–42 (footnote omitted). 
 42. Id. at 242–43 (footnotes omitted). 
 43. Id. at 241. 
 44. Id. at 243. 
9
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B. Constitutional Limitations and the Doctrine of Church Autonomy 
1. The Text and Original Understanding of the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses 
The First Amendment religion clauses originated in the unique 
circumstances of America‘s founding generation.45  The ideological 
battles of the American Revolution were fought, in important part, for 
religious liberty.46  At the same time, established churches had been part 
of the American experience from colonial days.  New England states 
other than Rhode Island had ―a localized Puritan establishment,‖ while 
the southern states had ―an exclusive Anglican establishment.‖47  Both 
models were coercive, sometimes resulting in the intense persecution of 
religious dissenters.48  Following the Revolutionary War, Virginia was 
―the only state that squarely considered and rejected every form of 
support or official recognition of religion.‖49  Official support for 
religion remained common throughout most states, but only in New 
England ―did a system of compulsory financial support for religion 
actually survive the Revolution.‖50  Massachusetts, for example, 
―reaffirmed its system of localized establishments‖ despite vigorous 
opposition from Baptists and other dissenters when it debated whether to 
ratify its constitution of 1780.51  By the 1780s, however, ―the official 
justification for governmental support for religion . . . ceased to have 
any real theological component‖ and relied instead on ―the civic 
justification that belief in religion would preserve the peace and good 
 
 45. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–
1815, at 71 (2009) [hereinafter EMPIRE] (―[T]he American Bill of Rights of 1791 was less a creative 
document than a defensive one. It made no universal claims but was rooted solely in the Americans‘ 
particular history.‖). 
 46. See, e.g., ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 
1763–1789, at 49–50 (rev. & expanded ed. 2005) (―Although Americans entered the revolt against 
Britain in several ways, their religion proved important in all of them . . . because, more than anything 
else in America, religion shaped culture.‖); BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 268 (1967) (describing ―the mutual reinforcement that took place in the 
Revolution between the struggles for civil and religious liberty‖); see also DONALD S. LUTZ, A PREFACE 
TO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 135, 136 (1992) (listing the Bible as the leading source of citation in 
American political writings between 1760–1805). 
 47. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part 1: 
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2115 (2003). 
 48. See id. at 2119, 2126.  According to McConnell, ―Baptist ministers [in Virginia] were still 
being horsewhipped and jailed as late as 1774 for preaching without a license‖ and ―Anglican ministers 
who refused to violate their oaths [of allegiance to the British Crown during the Revolutionary War] 
were dunked, beaten, stripped, tarred and feathered, and driven from their pulpits.‖  Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
 49. Id. at 2156. 
 50. Id. at 2157. 
 51. Id. at 2158. 
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order of society by improving men‘s morals and restraining their 
vices.‖52  And yet, ―the history of the founding period shows that free 
exercise and disestablishment were supported politically by the same 
people, with the strongest support for disestablishment coming from the 
most evangelical denominations of Americans.‖53 
The Constitution hammered out in Philadelphia contained only a 
single mention of religion, forbidding religious tests for federal office.54  
George Mason and others pointed to the absence of a bill of rights as a 
principal objection to ratification.55  Crucial large states—
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia—agreed to ratify the 
Constitution only on the promise of amendment.56  Proposed 
amendments specifically directed at protecting religious liberty were 
submitted by ratification conventions in eight states.57 
To keep the bargain struck for ratification, and to persuade North 
Carolina and Rhode Island to join the Union,58 James Madison led the 
fight in the first Congress to adopt the Bill of Rights.59  His proposed 
amendments began with a guarantee of religious liberty: ―The civil 
rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or 
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full 
and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext 
infringed.‖60  Subsequent debate refined this language into the familiar 
words of the First Amendment: ―Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .‖61  Ratification occurred ―slowly and without much 
enthusiasm‖62 in 1791. 
 
 52. Id. at 2197. 
 53. Id. at 2207. 
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (―[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States.‖). 
 55. See George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government, reprinted in 2 MAX 
FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637 (1937) (―There is no Declaration of 
Rights, and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and constitution of the 
several States, the Declaration of rights in the separate States are no security.‖). 
 56. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION, 1776–
1995, at 85 (1996). 
 57. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 11–13 
(Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997) [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
 58. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, 
at 447 (2010); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 59–62 (1993). 
 59. See EMPIRE, supra note 45, at 69 (―There is no question that it was Madison‘s personal 
prestige and his dogged persistence that saw the amendments through the Congress. There might have 
been a federal Constitution without Madison but certainly no Bill of Rights.‖). 
 60. James Madison, 1 Congressional Register 427, June 8, 1789, reprinted in BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 57, at 1. 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 62.  EMPIRE, supra note 45, at 72. 
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Scholars disagree over whether the Establishment Clause was 
originally understood to prevent the federal government from creating a 
national church and meddling in the churches established by the states63 
or, more generally, ―to protect the liberty of conscience of religious 
dissenters from the coercive power of government.‖64  The latter view 
has two signal defects.  First, it disregards the institution-protecting 
language that bars Congress from making laws ―respecting an 
establishment of religion.‖  Second, it replaces the operative term 
religion with ―conscience,‖ thereby expanding the constitutional text 
beyond its fair meaning.  The more convincing interpretation holds that 
the Establishment Clause reflects ―a structural restraint on the 
government‘s power to act on certain matters pertaining to (‗respecting‘) 
religion.‖65  Conceiving of the Establishment Clause as a structural 
restraint is consistent with the eighteenth century understanding of 
government as being limited to secular matters.66 
As a structural restraint, the Establishment Clause operated 
horizontally by ensuring that ―Congress had no authority to set up a 
national church, or even to support financially the full spectrum of 
American religions on a nonpreferential basis,‖67 and vertically by 
ensuring that ―Congress could not enact legislation operable at the state 
level on certain matters pertaining to (‗respecting‘) religion.‖68  The 
vertical restraint disappeared when the Establishment Clause was 
incorporated against the states.  Its horizontal restraint remains, ―as an 
exception to the Necessary and Proper Clause.‖69 
In addition, scholars disagree over whether the Free Exercise Clause 
was originally understood to support generalized claims to religious 
exemptions from civil laws.70  There is, however, consensus that the 
 
 63. See McConnell, supra note 47, at 2109 (―Contrary to popular myth, the First Amendment did 
not disestablish anything.  It prevented the newly formed federal government from establishing religion 
or from interfering in the religious establishments of the states.  The First Amendment thus preserved 
the status quo.‖). 
 64. Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 
350 (2002). 
 65. Esbeck, supra note 17, at 3–4 (footnote omitted). 
 66. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 17–18 (1965) [hereinafter GARDEN] (―[M]en 
of the eighteenth century who demanded a constitutional proscription of laws relating to religion did so 
because of the deep conviction that the realm of spirit lay beyond the reach of government.‖). 
 67. Esbeck, supra note 17, at 18 (footnote omitted). 
 68. Id. at 15 (footnotes omitted). 
 69. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 137 (2005) (―The Establishment Clause qualified the Necessary and Proper 
Clause by interdicting certain means of executing enumerated powers, even if those means were 
otherwise necessary and proper.‖). 
 70. Compare McConnell, supra note 13, at 1511 (―[T]he record shows that exemptions on 
account of religious scruple should have been familiar to the framers and ratifiers of the free exercise 
12
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clause was based on the understanding civil laws governed a secular 
realm that was largely distinct and separate from the realm governed by 
religious authority and conviction.71 
2. Growth of First Amendment Protections for Churches 
The religion clauses received little judicial treatment during the first 
century after their ratification.  Forty years passed before the U.S. 
Supreme Court held, in Barron v. Baltimore,72 that the first ten 
amendments of the Constitution did not apply to the states.  Chief 
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the 
Framers did not direct the first ten amendments to the states, as 
contrasted with the prohibitions of Article I, Section 10, which begins 
with the words ―No state shall . . . .‖73  The Court also pointed out that 
the Bill of Rights had been adopted in response to the state ratifying 
conventions‘ demands for ―security against apprehended encroachments 
of the general government—not against those of the local 
governments.‖74  Concluding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
was ―intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the 
Government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation 
of the States,‖75 the Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
This limitation on the Bill of Rights was applied to the First 
Amendment in Permoli v. New Orleans.76  The Court dismissed a 
religious free exercise claim brought by a Catholic priest who was fined 
by the city of New Orleans for performing funeral rites contrary to a city 
ordinance.77  Echoing Barron, the Court held that ―[t]he [federal] 
 
clause.  There is no substantial evidence that such exemptions were considered constitutionally 
questionable, whether as a form of establishment or as an invasion of liberty of conscience.‖), with 
Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 948 (1992) (―In eighteenth-century America, where varied Christian sects 
bickered with one another and thrived, a constitutional right to have different civil obligations on 
account of religious differences was precisely what dissenters did not demand.‖). 
 71. See Hamburger, supra note 70, at 936–37 (―One reason late eighteenth-century ideas about 
religious freedom did not seem to require a general religious exemption is that the jurisdiction of civil 
government and the authority of religion were frequently considered distinguishable.‖); McConnell, 
supra note 13, at 1512 (―[T]he evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinning of the free exercise 
clause, best reflected in Madison's writings, is that the claims of the ‗universal sovereign‘ precede the 
claims of civil society, both in time and in authority, and that when the people vested power in the 
government over civil affairs, they necessarily reserved their unalienable right to the free exercise of 
religion, in accordance with the dictates of conscience.‖). 
 72. 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 74. Barron, 32 U.S. at 250. 
 75. Id. at 250–51. 
 76. 44 U.S. 589 (1845). 
 77. See id. at 609, 590–91. 
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Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the 
respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state 
constitutions and laws.‖78 
State constitutions and laws provided the only legal bulwark against 
state government infringements on religious liberty through much of the 
nineteenth century.  Beginning with Chicago, B. & Q. R .Co. v. 
Chicago,79 however, the Supreme Court slowly eroded Barron through 
the process of selective incorporation.  Case by case, the Court reasoned 
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause impliedly 
incorporated specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights against 
infringement by state and local governments.80 
The First Amendment religion clauses were incorporated against the 
states in two seminal cases.  The Free Exercise Clause was incorporated 
in Cantwell v. Connecticut.81  There, the Court reversed the conviction 
of a Jehovah‘s Witness who was found guilty of violating a Connecticut 
statute that prohibited door-to-door solicitation without prior approval 
from a public official.82  The Court disposed of the statute in 
unambiguous terms, stating that it ―deprive[d] [plaintiffs] of their liberty 
without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.‖83  The Court went on to equate the guarantees furnished 
by the First Amendment religion clauses with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, holding that ―[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has rendered 
the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such 
laws.‖84 
In Everson v. Board of Education,85 the Court sustained a New Jersey 
statute authorizing the reimbursement of transportation costs for parents 
who sent their children to parochial schools.86  The question of 
incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states was little more 
than an aside.  Without discussion, the Court simply stated that ―[t]he 
 
 78. Id. at 609. 
 79. 166 U.S. 226, 258, 230, 241 (1897) (affirming an Illinois Supreme Court judgment that a 
railroad was entitled to compensation for the loss of part of its right-of-way on the principle that a 
decision ―whereby private property is taken for the state or under its direction for public use, without 
compensation made or secured to the owner, is . . . wanting in the due process of law required by the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment . . . .‖). 
 80. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (explaining that ―immunities 
that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular 
amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states‖) (footnote omitted). 
 81. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 82. See id. at 302–03. 
 83. Id. at 303. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 86. See id. at 18. 
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First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth . . . commands that a state ‗shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .‘‖87  The Court‘s analysis of the constitutional challenge 
against the statute rested largely on an historical discussion of the 
purposes animating the First Amendment.88 
a. Free Exercise Clause 
Today, pure Free Exercise Clause claims are governed by two leading 
Supreme Court decisions, Employment Division v. Smith89 and Church 
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.90  Smith decided that the 
Free Exercise Clause did not require a state to excuse religious believers 
from a religiously neutral law of general applicability, specifically a 
criminal prohibition on the use of controlled substances.91  The law was 
challenged by two members of the Native American Church who were 
denied unemployment compensation after being fired for ingesting 
peyote (listed as a controlled substance) during a religious ritual.92  The 
Court refused to subject this prohibition to the compelling interest test, 
finding it ―critical‖93 that the state‘s condition on eligibility for 
unemployment benefits consisted of conduct prohibited by law.  At the 
same time, it held that heightened scrutiny does apply to hybrid claims 
presenting ―the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections . . . .‖94  Further, the Court recognized the 
continuing applicability of the compelling interest test in discretionary 
contexts such as unemployment compensation that are characterized by 
―individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant 
conduct.‖95  The Court explained that ―where the State has in place a 
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system 
to cases of ‗religious hardship‘ without compelling reason.‖96  The Court 
further explained that its limitation on the reach of the compelling 
interest test did not affect well-established guarantees under the Free 
Exercise Clause: ―The government may not . . . impose special 
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status‖ or ―lend 
 
 87. Id. at 8 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943)). 
 88. See id. at 8–16. 
 89. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 90. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 91. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 890. 
 92. See id. at 874. 
 93. Id. at 876. 
 94. Id. at 881. 
 95. Id. at 884. 
 96. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
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its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma.‖97  The Court further underscored that the First 
Amendment is offended by government regulations that apply to acts or 
omissions ―only when they are engaged in for religious reasons.‖98 
Such a constitutional offense was squarely presented in City of 
Hiahleah.  Here, the Court struck down a city ordinance that prohibited 
the ritualistic sacrifice of animals but not their slaughter for food, a law 
that apparently targeted the unpopular Santeria religion.99  The Court 
reiterated that the compelling interest test applies to claims of religious 
persecution: ―A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or 
not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of 
scrutiny.‖100  Based on that principle, the Court reaffirmed its obligation 
to ―eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders,‖101 meaning any 
government action where ―religious practice is being singled out for 
discriminatory treatment.‖102  And the Court underscored ―[t]he 
principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a 
selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by 
religious belief.‖103 
Taken together, Smith and City of Hiahleah affirm that the Free 
Exercise Clause demands strict judicial scrutiny where: (1) laws or 
governmental actions burdening religion are not religiously neutral and 
generally applicable, especially where government targets a religion or 
religious practice for unfavorable treatment or special burdens, or 
creates religious gerrymanders; (2) laws or governmental actions that 
burden a ―hybrid‖ right consisting of the right to free exercise of 
religion, coupled with some other constitutional right; or (3) application 
of the law and the availability of exemptions depends on a discretionary 
system involving individualized assessments of the reasons for 
particular conduct. 
It bears note that these decisions are not the only word on legal 
protections for religious free exercise.  Federal and state statutes passed 
in response to Smith revived the compelling interest test even when 
generally applicable laws burden religious practice.  These include the 
federal RFRA104 and RLUIPA,105 and state RFRAs.106 
 
 97. Id. at 877 (citations omitted). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hiahleah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993). 
 100. Id. at 546. 
 101. Id. at 534 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm‘n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 102. Id. at 538 (citations omitted). 
 103. Id. at 543. 
 104. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
 105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 106. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 to 35/99 (2010). 
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RFRA‘s central provision directs that ―[g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person‘s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless] it demonstrates 
that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.‖107  RFRA was held to 
be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress‘s power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that it purported to regulate 
state and local governments108 but remains fully applicable to the federal 
government.109  RLUIPA specifically extends the compelling interest 
test to the context of local land use regulation and state prisons.110 
b. Establishment Clause 
Like the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause is designed 
―to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the church or the 
state] into the precincts of the other.‖111  It forbids ―sponsorship, 
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity.‖112  In addition, it requires neutrality, in that the government 
may not prefer one religion to another or religion to irreligion.113 
The Supreme Court‘s leading test for determining violations of the 
Establishment Clause comes from Lemon v. Kurtzman.114  The three-part 
Lemon test measures government action by whether: (1) it has ―a secular 
legislative purpose‖; (2) its chief effect ―neither advances nor inhibits 
religion‖; and (3) it ―foster[s] an excessive government entanglement 
with religion.‖115  Alternative tests have been proposed.  Justice 
Kennedy has proffered ―coercion‖ as another test for violations of the 
Establishment Clause.116  Justice O‘Connor long advocated an 
―endorsement‖ test, meaning that a law is invalid if the government 
intends its action to endorse or disapprove of religion or if a ―reasonable 
observer‖ would perceive the government‘s action as an endorsement or 
 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (punctuation modified). 
 108. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532, 536 (1997). 
 109. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) 
(applying RFRA to block application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to ban the sacramental 
use of a hallucinogenic tea). 
 110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 111. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984). 
 112. Walz v. Tax Comm‘n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
 113. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–54 (1985). 
 114. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 115. Id. at 612–13 (citations omitted).   
 116. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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disapproval.117  While both tests remain viable touchstones, neither has 
displaced Lemon. 
As applied to the internal operations of religious organizations, 
Lemon‘s charge to avoid ―excessive government entanglement‖118 has 
furnished a point of doctrinal constancy in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  While much Establishment Clause jurisprudence has 
focused on controversial issues like prayer in public schools and public 
displays of religious symbols, the Supreme Court has consistently and 
with little controversy prohibited civil court involvement in ―purely 
ecclesiastical‖ matters to ensure that government does not encroach on 
the sacred precincts of religion.  Scholars have dubbed this line of 
jurisprudence the ―church autonomy doctrine‖ or the ―ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine.‖  This bedrock principle that religious organizations 
must be preserved from the interference of civil government unites core 
concerns of both religion clauses as they were understood at the 
Founding.119 
3. The Church Autonomy Doctrine 
The Supreme Court first articulated what has become known as the 
church autonomy doctrine in Watson v. Jones.120  There, a minority 
faction of the Presbyterian Church of the United States brought suit for 
control of the property of the local church based on a claim that the 
majority had strayed from the church‘s true doctrine by denouncing 
slavery.121  The Court held that ―whenever the questions of discipline, or 
of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the 
highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, 
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on 
them . . . .‖122  Questions of judicial competence also influenced the 
 
 117. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O‘Connor, J., concurring); Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O‘Connor, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712 
(1994) (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 118. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
 119. See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 3–4 (footnote omitted) (characterizing the Establishment 
Clause as ―a structural restraint on the government‘s power to act on certain matters pertaining to 
religion‖); Hamburger, supra note 70, at 936–37 (―One reason late eighteenth-century ideas about 
religious freedom did not seem to require a general religious exemption is that the jurisdiction of civil 
government and the authority of religion were frequently considered distinguishable.‖); accord 
GARDEN, supra note 66, at 17–18 (―[M]en of the eighteenth century who demanded a constitutional 
proscription of laws relating to religion did so because of the deep conviction that the realm of spirit lay 
beyond the reach of government.‖). 
 120. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
 121. See id. at 694–95. 
 122. Id. at 727. 
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Court.123  The Court, therefore, deferred to the decision of the General 
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, the denomination‘s highest 
governing body, and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction as ―strictly and purely ecclesiastical.‖124  In sum, Watson 
held that civil courts have neither the subject matter jurisdiction nor the 
competence to adjudicate ecclesiastical matters.  These are issues for the 
church, not the state.125 
Watson was decided as a matter of federal common law before Erie 
and selective incorporation.  But Watson‘s doctrine of church autonomy 
received full constitutional status in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.126  
There, the Court struck down a New York law that shifted the right to 
appoint a Russian Orthodox archbishop, and thus the right to occupy and 
control a cathedral in New York, from the church‘s authorities in 
Moscow to authorities in the United States.  The statute had emerged 
from legitimate concerns that the church‘s hierarchy in Moscow was 
controlled by the Communist regime.127  
The Court reaffirmed Watson and imported its doctrine of church 
autonomy into the First Amendment.  It reasoned that ―[t]he opinion [in 
Watson] radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an 
independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to 
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.‖128  The Court held 
that the right of a church to select its clergy ―must now be said to have 
federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion 
against state interference.‖129  As the Court explained, ―[l]egislation that 
regulates church administration, the operation of the churches, [or] the 
appointment of clergy . . . prohibits the free exercise of religion.‖130  The 
Court went on to state that such issues are ―strictly a matter of 
 
 123. See id. at 729 (―It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent 
in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference 
to their own.‖). 
 124. Id. at 733.  
 125. The principles elaborated in Watson later guided the Court‘s decision in Gonzalez v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), involving a dispute over entitlement to a Roman Catholic 
chaplaincy and its attributable income.  The Archbishop had refused to appoint the petitioner to the 
chaplaincy because under Catholic Canon Law he was unqualified.  See id. at 12.  In an opinion by 
Justice Brandeis, the Court rejected the civil court challenge and upheld the autonomy of the church ―to 
determine what the essential qualifications of [clergy] are and whether the candidate possesses them.‖  
Id. at 19 (citing Watson, 80 U.S. at 727, 733). 
 126. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 127. See id. at 106–07. 
 128. Id. at 116 (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at 107–08; accord Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (extending 
Kedroff to cover judicial actions as well as legislative actions). 
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ecclesiastical government‖ and thus of no concern to the state.131  While 
the Court recognized the state‘s legitimate interest in suppressing 
subversive activity, and acknowledged that such activity (if found) could 
be criminally punished,132 the Court made clear that state intrusion into 
the ecclesiastical affairs of the church ―violates [the] rule of separation 
between church and state‖133 and contravenes ―the philosophy of 
ecclesiastical control of church administration and polity.‖134 
The constitutional stature of the church autonomy doctrine was 
recognized again in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Church.135  The Court held that civil courts cannot ―engage in the 
forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine.‖136  
Such a process, the Court held, ―can play no role in any . . . judicial 
proceedings‖ because it unconstitutionally ―inject[s] the civil courts into 
substantive ecclesiastical matters.‖137  Significantly, the Court also 
recognized that litigation against religious organizations could readily 
disrupt the delicate process by which religious beliefs and doctrines are 
generated.138 
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,139 the Court 
further held that the right of church autonomy ―applies with equal force 
to church disputes over church polity and church administration.‖140  
Quoting Watson, the Court reiterated that the First Amendment dictates 
that ―civil courts exercise no jurisdiction‖ over ―a matter which concerns 
theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or 
the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals 
required of them.‖141  The Court held that disgruntled clergy or church 
members cannot call on civil courts to challenge the decisions of church 
officials regarding such matters: 
Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are 
reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational 
or measurable by objective criteria.  Constitutional concepts of due 
process, involving secular notions of ‗fundamental fairness‘ or 
 
 131. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115. 
 132. See id. at 109. 
 133. Id. at 110. 
 134. Id. at 117. 
 135. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
 136. Id. at 451. 
 137. Id. at 450–51. 
 138. See id. at 449 (noting that when courts intrude into ecclesiastical matters ―the hazards are 
ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests 
in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.‖). 
 139. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 140. Id. at 710. 
 141. Id. at 713–14 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733–34 (1871)). 
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Milivojevich summed up the church autonomy doctrine by holding that 
―the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious 
organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal 
discipline and government . . . .‖143 
Similar First Amendment concerns compelled the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.144  In this case, the 
NLRB attempted to apply neutral principles of labor law to two groups 
of Catholic high schools.145  The Court rejected the attempt.  Noting that 
many of the ―challenged actions [of the schools] were mandated by their 
religious creeds,‖146 the Court interpreted the National Labor Relations 
Act narrowly so as to preclude the Board from interfering in the internal 
management of the schools,147 holding: 
The resolution of [claims that certain decisions were religiously 
motivated], in many instances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the 
good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its 
relationship to the school‘s religious mission.  It is not only the 
conclusions that may be reached by the Board [in adjudicating such 
claims] which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, 




Any question about whether these church autonomy cases remain 
viable after Smith was definitively put to rest by the Supreme Court‘s 
unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission.149  There, a 
―called‖ teacher at a religious school brought an action under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the school and its 
sponsoring church claiming she was unlawfully terminated in retaliation 
for asserting her legal rights under the ADA.  The federal district court 
granted summary judgment for the church on the ground that the 
teacher‘s claim fell within the ministerial exception.150  The court of 
appeals acknowledged that the ministerial exception applies in certain 
circumstances but reversed on the ground that the de minimis nature of 
 
 142. Id. at 714–15. 
 143. Id. at 724. 
 144. 440 U.S. at 490. 
 145. See id. at 491–93. 
 146. Id. at 502. 
 147. See id. at 507. 
 148. Id. at 502. 
 149. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 150. See id. at 701. 
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the teacher‘s religious duties placed her outside the scope of the 
exception.151  Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that, 
notwithstanding forty years of unanimous precedent in the lower courts, 
the ministerial exception did not exist under the First Amendment 
religion clauses and, even assuming it did, that the plaintiff still would 
not qualify as a minister.152 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the plaintiff‘s and EEOC‘s 
―extreme‖153 position, holding that the First Amendment requires the 
ministerial exception and that it barred the plaintiff‘s and EEOC‘s 
discrimination suit.  The decision rested on broad principles of church 
autonomy over internal religious affairs—principles that the Court said 
arise from both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.154  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the continuing viability of the 
church autonomy line of cases, including Watson, Kedroff, and 
Milivojevich,155 and the constitutional limits they impose on the power 
of government and courts to interfere with ecclesiastical matters.  In 
doing so, the Court squarely rejected the argument—often advanced by 
plaintiffs suing churches—that the rule in Employment Division v. Smith 
precludes strong First Amendment defenses against legal claims 
interfering with a religious organization‘s internal affairs as long as such 
claims are based on laws that are generally applicable and facially 
neutral toward religion and religious practices.156  The Court explained 
that ―Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical 
acts.  The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference 
with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the 
church itself.‖157  The church autonomy doctrine, in other words, falls 
outside the rule in Smith.  The Supreme Court also rejected as 
―untenable‖ and ―remarkable‖ the plaintiff‘s and the EEOC‘s argument 
that religious organizations should be treated no different than secular 
organizations with expressive rights, holding instead that ―the text of the 
First Amendment itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of 
religious organizations.‖158  Nor did the Court accept the government‘s 
position that monetary compensation and damages—as opposed to 
injunctive relief—could be awarded to the plaintiff without 
 
 151. See id. at 701–702. 
 152. See id. at 706, 708–709. 
 153. Id. at 709. 
 154. See id. at 702. 
 155. See id. at 704–705. 
 156. See id. at 706–707. 
 157. Id. at 707 (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 706. 
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unconstitutionally trespassing on internal church affairs: ―An award of 
such relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an 
unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First 
Amendment than an order overturning the termination.‖159 
This line of decisions firmly settles the First Amendment right of 
churches and religious organizations to autonomy—that is, non-
interference by civil authorities—in internal ecclesiastical matters.  
Rooted in both free exercise and non-establishment principles, the 
doctrine interposes a structural barrier between internal ecclesiastical 
affairs on the one hand and civil power on the other by guaranteeing a 
sphere of activity with ―independence from secular control or 
manipulation,‖160 a sphere where ―civil courts exercise no 
jurisdiction.‖161  This constitutionally protected sphere includes 
questions of religious faith and doctrine; disputes calling for 
adjudication of ecclesiastical structure or polity; the relationship 
between a religious organization and its ministers and teachers of the 
faith; and the standards by which church members are admitted, guided, 
disciplined, and expelled.162  In each of these areas, tort law doctrines of 
duty, breach, liability, and relief confront a constitutional barrier that 
often completely bars and, at the very least, substantially limits the types 
of claims brought. 
Properly understanding how the church autonomy doctrine sets limits 
on tort law has significant constitutional and practical consequences.  
Legislative and adjudicative decisions that impose one-size-fits-all rules 
on religious organizations may unwittingly infringe upon deeply valued 
and long-established constitutional rights.  The practical consequences 
are no less real.  When courts view church autonomy as a longstanding 
First Amendment doctrine that limits the power of government to act 
upon religious organizations in their internal matters, it reduces the 
doctrinal confusion that often arises from treating churches as no 
different than secular organizations.  Correctly understood, the church 
autonomy doctrine sets constitutional boundaries on the scope of tort 
law, thereby presenting threshold considerations for defining duty and 
liability when tort actions are brought against religious institutions.  It is 
to these considerations that we now turn. 
 
 159. Id. at 709. 
 160. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
 161. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713–14 (1976) (quoting Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733–34 (1871)). 
 162. See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 44–45. 
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III. APPLYING THE CHURCH AUTONOMY DOCTRINE TO LIMIT TORT LAW 
PROTECTS RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN FAMILIAR WAYS 
As a preliminary matter, an objection to the very notion of placing 
boundaries on the scope of tort law should be addressed.  Some 
commentators argue that tort law must be applied uniformly to all 
defendants, that every injury requires a civil remedy, and that any 
departure from such uniformity for the benefit of churches and religious 
organizations is unjustified.163  To be sure, this argument holds some 
superficial appeal.  It squares with today‘s litigious zeitgeist, ―an era of 
heightened sensitivity to those who claim injury or some other victim-
like status,‖ and the corresponding demand for ―compensation, achieved 
by holding the tortfeasor monetarily liable.‖164  Measured against these 
sensibilities, the idea that the church autonomy doctrine places 
boundaries on tort law may appear to be alien or unwelcome because it 
curbs the availability of monetary damages for those who claim injuries 
from religious organizations.  Sacrificing relief for individual victims in 
the name of protecting churches from civil liability might be viewed as 
an unwarranted exception to our society‘s commitment to equal justice. 
But this objection falters when considering how the law treats 
religious organizations outside of tort law and how tort law treats 
important social institutions besides religious organizations.  Special 
rules exist, in and out of tort law, for special cases.  The special 
protections for religious organizations discussed previously—such as 
RFRA and RLUIPA, exceptions from Title VII, procedural protections 
in bankruptcy, and other provisions that ensure separation of church and 
state—would fall if the availability of a remedy for every perceived 
wrong were erected into an absolute rule.  Each of these provisions 
protects religious organizations from the unrestrained force of generally 
applicable legal rules for the sake of preserving the social and personal 
benefits such organizations provide.  Put simply, the law recognizes that 
compensating an injured party, preventing discrimination, deferring to 
local land use bodies, making creditors whole, and so forth are not the 
only legal values worth preserving. 
 
 163. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, The No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public 
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1116 (arguing that ―religious entities be treated and regulated as any 
other entity in society‖ and that ―[t]here can be no church autonomy in a society that values citizens 
equally‖); Kelly W.G. Clark, Kristian Spencer Roggendorf & Peter B. Janci, Of Compelling Interest: 
The Intersection of Religious Freedom and Civil Liability in the Portland Priest Sex Abuse Cases, 85 
OR. L. REV. 481, 512–13 (2006) (arguing that the church autonomy doctrine ―would be misapplied if 
used to shield the Church from civil tort liability in the priest abuse cases‖ and that applying the doctrine 
in the tort setting would mark a serious departure from the rule that ―courts may exercise jurisdiction 
over religious bodies in secular matters, including tort cases‖). 
 164. Idleman, supra note 39, at 242–43 (footnote omitted). 
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Nor is compensating the injured an absolute principle even within tort 
law itself.  Courts and legislatures have pursued a more moderate and 
context-sensitive approach that accords institutions special protection 
from the full reach of tort law as a means of advancing social values—
including constitutional rights—deemed more important than an 
inflexible rule of affording a remedy for every injury.  For instance, 
many courts consider a multitude of factors and public policies in 
determining whether a duty of care even exists in a particular 
circumstance, such as: 
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant‘s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to 
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent 
of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and 
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
165
 
These policy considerations necessarily include First Amendment 
protections and sensitivities when churches and clergy are involved.166 
The following examples demonstrate that limiting the scope of duties 
or carving out exceptions to protect certain interests, including those of 
religious organizations, is nothing new in tort law.  Again, in tort law 
context matters.167  Churches are not treated the same as commercial 
enterprises such as gas stations because, quite simply, they are not gas 
stations, but rather constitutionally-protected communities with 
purposes beyond mere commerce. 
A. Tort Rules Crafted to Protect Institutions With Special Social or 
Constitutional Significance 
Tort law recognizes what amounts to a ―press autonomy doctrine‖ by 
imposing a heightened standard on certain plaintiffs that claim libel or 
defamation against the press.  In New York Times v. Sullivan, the 
 
 165. Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212 n.5 (Cal. 1993), abrogated by Reid v. 
Google, Inc., 235 P.3d 988 (Cal. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 166. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 956–61 (1988) (holding 
that First Amendment concerns prevent courts from treating the religious relationship between a church 
and its congregants as the basis for a secular duty without holding that the First Amendment strictly bars 
such a duty). 
 167. It bears note that not only tort law but even criminal law sometimes takes a back seat to 
special protections for religion.  The clergy-penitent privilege, for example, bars consideration of 
evidence of confession of crimes to clergy, even if the perpetrator of a murder ultimately goes free.  See, 
e.g.,  Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing history of clergy privilege and 
holding that seizure of jailhouse confession of triple murder violated right to confidentiality between 
priest and penitent). 
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Supreme Court held that the First Amendment ―prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to 
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 
‗actual malice‘—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.‖168  This rule arose 
from ―a recognition that the First Amendment guarantee of a free press 
is inevitably in tension with state libel laws designed to secure society‘s 
interest in the protection of individual reputation.‖169  Importantly, this 
tension was not blithely resolved in favor of vindicating the right to 
recover for reputational damage as if no other legal value merits 
consideration in tort law.  Instead, the Court found that the First 
Amendment guarantee of free speech required it to shield the press from 
the full force of libel law when the publication had to do with public 
officials. 
The Court‘s most basic reason for adopting this heightened standard 
is that ―erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must 
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‗breathing 
space‘ that they ‗need . . . to survive‘ . . . .‖170  NAACP v. Button, on 
which the New York Times Court relied for this idea of constitutionally 
mandated breathing space, explained its reasoning: 
These [First Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well 
as supremely precious in our society.  The threat of sanctions may deter 
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of 
sanctions . . . .  Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space 




Tellingly, the Button Court cited Cantwell, a leading free exercise case, 
to support the need for such breathing space from the effects of civil 
litigation.172  Religious liberty requires such space, no less than other 
First Amendment freedoms. 
The same concern with the effect of tort law on constitutional rights 
led the Court to extend the New York Times standard to shield the 
notorious Hustler magazine from liability for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.173  There, the Court took pains to emphasize that 
even though: 
 
 168. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 169. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 270 (1971). 
 170. 376 U.S. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 171. Button, 371 U.S. at 433. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52, 56 (1988) (relying on the need for 
―breathing space‖ as a central reason to conclude that a press defendant was immune from a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
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[T]he law [generally] does not regard the intent to inflict emotional 
distress as one which should receive much solicitude . . . [and] while such 
a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in 
other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a 
result in the area of public debate about public figures.
174
 
In short, the availability of a tort remedy gave way to the 
constitutional value of free speech in order to protect the First 
Amendment‘s guarantee of ―public debate about public figures.‖175 
These constitutional protections for free speech remain as vibrant as 
ever.  The Supreme Court recently reversed a multi-million dollar jury 
verdict against a church and its members on a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  In Snyder v. Phelps,176 the Court held 
that a church, its pastor, and some of its parishioners could not be held 
liable for holding a deeply offensive political protest near a military 
funeral.  The Court reasoned that the church members‘ messages were 
entitled to ―special protection‖177 under the Free Speech Clause because 
their picketing occurred ―at a public place on a matter of public 
concern.‖178  It further reasoned that a jury finding of ―outrageousness‖ 
arose from ―a highly malleable standard‖179 that was insufficient to 
overcome the church‘s free speech rights.  Satisfying the common law 
elements of a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
was, therefore, considered insufficient to supersede the church‘s 
constitutionally guaranteed free speech rights. 
Tort law also runs up against limits placed by state and federal law on 
the extent of liability borne by state and municipal governments and 
their employees.  State statutes frequently curb such liability by placing 
exemptions or qualifications on the government‘s amenability to suit or 
on remedies available against a government defendant.180  Without such 
limits, state and local governments would be hampered in carrying out 
their responsibilities by the constant threat that even meritorious 
lawsuits would divert scarce public resources from higher ends.  Federal 
law is also solicitous of local government prerogatives.  The primary 
 
 174. Id. at 53. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See, e.g., CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 818 (West 2012) (excusing public entities from liability for 
punitive damages); Id. at § 818.8 (excusing public entities from liability for intentional or negligent 
misrepresentation); FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (2011) (describing the terms of the state‘s ―limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity,‖ including a ban on punitive damages and pre-judgment interest); MINN. STAT. 
§ 3.736, subd. 3 (2010) (setting forth several exclusions from tort liability for the state and is employees, 
including a flat ban on the state‘s payment of punitive damages); Id. at § 466.03 (setting forth several 
exclusions from tort liability for municipal governments and their employees). 
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federal statute for vindicating the infringement of constitutional rights 
by state and local governments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has been construed to 
bar vicarious liability against municipalities.181  Hiring a tortfeasor is not 
enough to subject a city to liability under § 1983, no matter how 
egregious the employee‘s actions. 
The discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA)182 provides another example of a broad limit on 
governmental tort liability.  This exception bars any negligence claim 
―based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency 
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion 
involved be abused.‖183  The rationale for the exception is to avoid 
second-guessing or impeding the function and decision-making process 
of government officials, which would necessarily arise from the fear of 
potential tort liability.184  Rather, tort law‘s focus on providing a remedy 
for every wrong steps aside to facilitate the ends of government 
efficiency and unencumbered decision making. 
In addition, Good Samaritan laws, which have been adopted by 
virtually every state,185 provide yet another prevalent example of tort 
law yielding to other public policy considerations.  These laws preclude, 
or at least limit, tort liability for medical professionals or other 
individuals who offer assistance to imperiled individuals in order to 
promote and encourage such assistance.186 
A final illustration can be seen in the abolishment of common law 
actions, most often by so-called heart balm statutes, for certain 
traditional wrongs arising from consensual, intimate relationships.  In 
California, for example, causes of action for alienation of affection, 
criminal conversation, seduction of a person over the age of legal 
consent, or breach of a marriage promise have each been abolished by 
the legislature.187  Likewise, ―[a] fraudulent promise to marry or to 
cohabit after marriage does not give rise to a cause of action for 
damages.‖188  It is not that these causes of action fail to address very real 
harms.  Rather, California‘s decision to abolish such claims reflects the 
 
 181. See Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978). 
 182. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006). 
 183. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
 184. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 (1991). 
 185. See Stewart R. Reuter, Physicians As Good Samaritans, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 157 (1999) 
(noting that all states and the District of Columbia have Good Samaritan statutes, with some even 
having multiple laws ―to give additional categories of potential Good Samaritan immunity‖). 
 186. See id. at 158 (noting that doctors feared liability as well as the costs of litigation prior to 
Good Samaritan statutes‘ enactment). 
 187. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 2012). 
 188. Id. § 43.4. 
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judgment that notwithstanding such harms ―certain sexual conduct and 
interpersonal decisions are, on public policy grounds, outside the realm 
of tort liability.‖189  Many states have followed the same approach.190  
Although problems of evidence and fraud figured among the reasons for 
abrogating these kinds of claims, the effect has been to create a tort-free 
zone for intimate relationships.  Since evidentiary and fraud problems 
exist and are dealt with in many areas of tort law, abrogation could be 
defended just as well, if not better, on the ground of society‘s interest in 
safeguarding the autonomy of intimate relationships from the corrosive 
effects of civil litigation. 
As these examples illustrate, the right to compensation is not the only 
value at stake when defining tort law claims.  Common law claims have 
been limited or abolished to protect institutions and groups of 
individuals such as the press, state and local governments, rescuers, and 
those in intimate relationships that serve constitutional and social values 
thought to supersede the bare right to compensation. 
B. Crafting Tort Rules to Avoid Injuring Religious Institutions Serves 
Constitutional and Social Values 
The diverse examples presented above show how much the law of tort 
has been crafted to protect important societal institutions.  Together 
these exceptions, immunities, and accommodations reflect the practical 
wisdom of Justice Cardozo‘s warning about ―[t]he tendency of a 
principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.‖191  Crafting tort law to 
avoid unnecessary collisions with the autonomy of religious institutions 
thus reflects a well-established pattern in the law, not an unwarranted 
anomaly. 
Religion is special under the Constitution.  The very first words of the 
First Amendment mark it out as distinctive: ―Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.‖192  The text of the religion clauses evinces the 
 
 189. Perry v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Cal. 1987). 
 190. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 771.01 (2011) (―The rights of action heretofore existing to recover 
sums of money as damage for the alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction or breach of 
contract to marry are hereby abolished.‖); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney 2012) (―The rights 
of action to recover sums of money as damages for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, 
education, or breach of contract to marry are abolished.  No act done within this state shall operate to 
give rise, either within or without this state, to any such right of action.  No contract to marry made or 
entered into in this state shall operate to give rise, either within or without this state, to any cause or 
right of action for its breach.‖); TEX. FAM. CODE § 1.106 (West 2012) (―A right of action by one spouse 
against a third party for criminal conversation is not authorized in this state.‖); Id. § 1.107 (―A right of 
action by one spouse against a third party for alienation of affection is not authorized in this state.‖). 
 191. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921). 
 192. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Framers‘ ―respect for religion‘s special role in society‖193 and, in 
particular, ―gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.‖194  As Professor McConnell has noted, ―[t]he textual 
insistence on the special status of ‗religion‘ is, moreover, rooted in the 
prevailing understandings, both religious and philosophical, of the 
difference between religious faith and other forms of human 
judgment.‖195  The Supreme Court and individual justices have 
recognized that ―[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause, which by its terms, gives special protection to the 
exercise of religion.‖196  The Court has also recognized that ―[a]s the 
language of the Clause itself makes clear, an individual‘s free exercise 
of religion is a preferred constitutional activity.‖197 
Protecting the free exercise of religion necessarily requires protection 
for the religious institutions and faith communities that make religious 
exercise possible and meaningful.  As explained at the outset, religious 
organizations produce unique individual and social goods that merit 
special legal protection.198  Without it, government actions, whether 
legislative, regulatory, or judicial, can distort or destroy those 
organizations and the goods they produce.  In fact, to label the benefits 
produced by religious organizations as ―goods‖ is potentially 
misleading.  The word adequately describes the social benefits that 
religious organizations deliver in the form of food, shelter, and other 
welfare services, but ―goods‖ fails to capture the profound 
understandings, duties, benefits, and life-shaping commitments that 
characterize the connections between religious organizations and 
individual believers.  For many religious believers, those connections 
form the most significant relationships of their lives.  
Law can skew those connections, thereby compromising a religious 
organization‘s capacity to continue functioning as a locus of faith.  The 
tendency of faith-based and secular legal standards to be 
incommensurable leaves churches and other religious organizations 
especially vulnerable to the coercive (and from their perspective, 
corrosive) forces of law.  Litigation, actual or threatened, against a 
religious organization carries the possibility of distorting a faith 
community‘s ―process of self-definition‖ by imposing money damages 
 
 193. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O‘Connor, J., concurring); see also 
McConnell, supra note 13, at 1496. 
 194. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp‘t Opportunity Comm‘n, 
132 S. Ct. 694, 712–13 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 195. McConnell, supra note 13, at 1496. 
 196. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (citations omitted). 
 197. Emp‘t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901–02 (1990) (O‘Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (citing Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9). 
 198. See supra Part II.A. 
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as the price of adhering to a religiously-motivated practice that a judge 
or jury finds objectionable.  This chain of events naturally poses ―the 
danger of chilling religious activity.‖199  As with other First Amendment 
freedoms, the rights protected by the religion clauses ―are delicate and 
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society.‖200  And just as 
other First Amendment freedoms ―need breathing space to survive,‖ so 
too religious liberty requires that government regulate ―only with 
narrow specificity.‖201 
Crafting tort law with ―narrow specificity‖202 to avoid infringing the 
constitutionally protected autonomy of religious institutions thus reflects 
society‘s regard for the importance of religious organizations and this 
Nation‘s most profound constitutional principles.  It is to that task of 
assessing and crafting tort doctrines in light of the church autonomy 
doctrine that we now turn. 
IV. EASY ANSWERS AND CUTTING-EDGE QUESTIONS IN THE COLLISION 
BETWEEN THE CHURCH AUTONOMY DOCTRINE AND TORT LAW 
A. Tort Claims Against Religious Organizations For Which the First 
Amendment Denies Jurisdiction 
Correctly applied, the First Amendment‘s church autonomy doctrine 
should clearly bar various civil claims against religious organizations.  
These include (1) claims for clergy malpractice or breach of fiduciary 
duty arising out of an exclusively religious relationship; (2) claims 
arising from church membership status or criteria or from ecclesiastical 
discipline of church members (including excommunication); (3) claims 
against churches by ministers, other clerics, or those with important 
religious or internal governance functions based on allegations of 
wrongful termination, discrimination, or breach of employment 
contracts, as well as claims by third parties against churches or church 
officials for the negligent hiring or termination of clergy; (4) claims that 
a clergy member violated a religious duty to maintain the confidentiality 
of a member‘s confession or other statement; and (5) claims based on a 
church‘s alleged failure to follow its own doctrines, policies, or 
ecclesiastical standards.  Each of these claims presents such palpable 
conflicts with the church autonomy doctrine that it has usually been an 
easy matter for courts to dismiss them as beyond the competence of civil 
 
 199. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 343–44 (1987) (citation omitted). 
 200. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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courts. 
1. Clergy Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Ecclesiastical counseling and other religious relationships between 
church leaders and church members sometimes lead to claims that 
clergy should be held to a court-defined standard of care under a claim 
of clergy malpractice, conceived as analogous to other forms of 
professional malpractice.  However, appellate courts have unanimously 
rejected such claims.203  Courts commonly cite the unconstitutionality 
and impossibility of interpreting church doctrine in order to define a 
standard of care for clergy within a particular faith and then to determine 
whether a cleric‘s conduct fell below that standard.204 
The reasons for rejecting clergy malpractice were memorably 
articulated in the leading case of Nally v. Grace Community Church of 
the Valley.205  There, the California Supreme Court rejected a claim of 
negligence against a clergyman for allegedly failing to warn parents of 
the mental state of their son who committed suicide after receiving 
religious counseling.  The court explained that ―[b]ecause of the 
differing theological views espoused by the myriad of religions in our 
state and practiced by church members, it would certainly be 
impractical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care 
on pastoral counselors.‖206  The court also discerned that ―[s]uch a duty 
would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the 
particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious 
 
 203. See, e.g., Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 204 (Utah 
2001) (―[C]ourts throughout the United States have uniformly rejected claims for clergy malpractice 
under the First Amendment‖); accord Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987); Cherepski v. 
Walker, 913 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1996); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); F.G. v. 
MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907 
(Neb. 1993); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of 
Sallisaw, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993).  
 204. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 327–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (―Any effort by this 
Court to instruct the trial jury as to the duty of care which a clergyman should exercise, would of 
necessity require the Court or the jury to define and express the standard of care to be followed by other 
reasonable Presbyterian clergy of the community.  This in turn would require the Court and the jury to 
consider the fundamental perspective and approach to counseling inherent in the beliefs and practices of 
that denomination.  This is as unconstitutional as it is impossible.‖) (citations omitted); Amato v. 
Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (―To permit claims for clergy malpractice would 
require courts to establish a standard of reasonable care for religious practitioners practicing their 
respective faiths, which necessarily involves the interpretation of [religious] doctrine.‖); H.R.B. v. 
J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that adjudication of clergy malpractice claims 
―would require courts to define and express the standard of care followed by a reasonable clergy of the 
particular faith involved, which in turn would require the Court‖ to examine and interpret the religious 
doctrines). 
 205. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988). 
 206. Id. at 960. 
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entity.‖207 
The Nally court was correct that there cannot be ―a reasonable clergy 
standard‖ similar to standards applied to physicians or other 
professionals.  Theological understandings of the nature and role of 
clergy in the lives of parishioners and within a worshipping community 
differ radically among faith traditions and even within different 
denominations of the same faith tradition.  What a Catholic priest, 
Protestant pastor, Jewish rabbi, Mormon bishop, Muslim imam, or 
leader of another faith ought to say or do in counseling or caring for a 
parishioner is defined by scripture, religious doctrines, sacred tradition, 
ecclesiastical policies and procedures, and a host of other religious 
intangibles depending on the religion.  In some faiths, a cleric is a literal 
mediator between God and an individual, while in others he or she is a 
fellow believer with special religious training.  In some religions, one 
has a duty to submit to the divine leadership of clergy, while in others 
the very concept of human spiritual authority does not exist.  Numerous 
other conceptions exist amidst the great diversity of American religions.  
Thus, a plaintiff‘s allegation that a cleric failed to provide the 
counseling, care or protection required by the religion or by the 
plaintiff‘s ―reasonable‖ religious expectations simply cannot be 
adjudicated in civil courts because there are no objective secular 
standards by which to evaluate such claims.  They would require civil 
courts to make religious rather than legal judgments, and to impose 
secular duties on clergy that may conflict with religious duties, in 
violation of the First Amendment.  The same is true of a claim that all 
religious officials should conform to some secular standard of clergy 
reasonableness; there is simply no religion-neutral, secular basis for 
determining what duties clergy of myriad faiths owe to their 
parishioners, and any attempt to create such a duty would amount to 
governmental regulation of religion.  Courts, to their credit, have done a 
good job of making clear that issues of clergy malpractice are 
ecclesiastical matters that under the First Amendment must be addressed 
by religious institutions, not the judiciary. 
Practically identical constitutional considerations have prompted 
courts to hold that no legally cognizable fiduciary duty arises from 
purely ecclesiastical relationships.208  A fiduciary duty imposes a legally 
enforceable obligation to act for the benefit of another person on matters 
within the scope of the relationship.209  Typical fiduciary relationships 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. 321; 
Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc‘y of N.Y., Inc., 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999); Gray v. Ward, 
950 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1997); Schieffer, 508 N.W.2d at 907; L.C. v. R.P., 563 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1997). 
 209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) 
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include those of principal and agent, attorney and client, trustee and 
beneficiary, and guardian and ward.210 
Breach of fiduciary duty claims against clergy are often dismissed as 
thinly disguised claims of clergy malpractice.211  Courts have recognized 
that the problem with claiming breach of fiduciary duty against clergy or 
churches under most circumstances is the impossibility of defining the 
nature and scope of the alleged duty of care without intruding into the 
constitutionally protected autonomy of religious organizations.212 
Shoehorning clerics and congregants into a fiduciary relationship with 
legal duties violates the church autonomy doctrine because, in 
determining the nature of such context-specific relationships, the 
judicial analysis ―inevitably require[s] inquiry into the religious aspects 
of the [clergy–parishioner] relationship‖ in order to establish ―the duty 
owed by [a cleric] to [his or her] parishioners.‖213  Plaintiffs sometimes 
specifically allege a fiduciary duty based on the trust and confidence 
they placed in their cleric because of his or her spiritual authority and 
their own devotion to church teachings.  These are precisely the types of 
allegations civil courts refuse to consider.214  ―However consequential 
[such a relationship] may be in a religious context, it provides no basis 
to support liability in a civil context.‖215  As noted, clerics and 
congregants relate to each other in diverse and often contradictory ways, 
depending on a particular faith‘s understanding of the nature and role of 
clergy in a parishioner‘s spiritual life.  From this diversity of 
understandings, ―it is impossible to show the existence of a fiduciary 
 
§ 42 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004). 
 210. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 795 (1983). 
 211. See Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1428–29 (affirming the district court‘s rejection of a fiduciary duty 
claim as ―an elliptical way to state a clergy malpractice claim‖); Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 327 (―The 
Court must address the real issue here—clergy malpractice—rather than plaintiff‘s rather fanciful 
characterization of the claim as ‗counseling malpractice.‘‖). 
 212. See Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1438 (―If the court were to recognize such a [claim for] breach of 
fiduciary duty, it would be required to define a reasonable duty standard and to evaluate [the clergy‘s] 
conduct against that standard . . . .‖); Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 326 (―[I]n analyzing and defining the 
scope of a fiduciary duty owed persons by their clergy, the Court would be confronted by the same 
constitutional difficulties encountered in articulating the generalized standard of care for a clergyman 
required by the law of negligence.‖); H.R.B., 913 S.W.2d at 99 (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim ―inevitably require[s] inquiry into the religious aspects of the [clergy–parishioner] relationship‖ in 
order to establish ―the duty owed by [a clergy] to [his or her] parishioners.‖); Langford v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 677 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (N.Y. 1998) (rejecting breach of fiduciary duty 
claim on finding it ―impossible to show the existence of a fiduciary relationship [in clergy–parishioner 
cases] without resort to religious facts‖). 
 213. H.R.B., 913 S.W.2d at 99. 
 214. Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 449 Mass. 235, 249-50 (2007) (holding 
that the First Amendment ―clearly forbid[s] [a court‘s] consideration of the religious obligations, if any, 
of a clergy member to his or her congregants, or of the ‗trust and confidence‘ that may be engendered in 
congregants solely by viture of the clergy‘s religious authority‖). 
 215. Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Mass. 2009). 
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relationship [in clergy–parishioner cases] without resort to religious 
facts.‖216  Stated simply, the same constitutional limits that prevent 
courts from entertaining claims for clergy malpractice likewise prevent 
them from imposing a ―reasonable clergyman‖ standard in the form of a 
one-size-fits-all fiduciary duty.217  Claims of fiduciary duty have been 
rejected even when a pastoral counseling relationship develops into a 
consensual sexual relationship among adults, although courts are 
somewhat divided on this point.218  The central animating principle of 
these decisions is that religious relationships and their concomitant 
religious duties do not by themselves create secular fiduciary duties.219 
A more difficult issue arises when a person is qualified both as a 
member of the clergy and as a licensed professional.  In sorting out such 
claims, courts avoid imposing a fiduciary duty where the claim is 
founded on a religious counseling relationship and the defendant is both 
a cleric and a professionally trained counselor.  However pleaded, 
asserting that an ecclesiastical defendant failed to exercise his or her 
religious authority consistent with proper religious standards amounts to 
the uniformly discredited claim of clergy malpractice.220  The issue is 
not whether the defendant holds a professional license or whether 
professional standards were violated; it is whether he or she was acting 
 
 216. Langford, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 439 (rejecting fiduciary duty claim). 
 217. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU 
L. REV. 1789, 1823 (inviting a court to determine the standard of care for ―a ‗reasonable Catholic priest‘ 
or a ‗reasonable Orthodox rabbi‘ . . . are precisely the kinds of appraisals that the doctrine of [church 
autonomy] bars‖). 
 218. See Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead, 892 N.E.2d 375, 376, 379 (N.Y. 2008) 
(―Allegations that give rise to only a general clergy-congregant relationship that includes aspects of 
counseling do not generally impose a fiduciary obligation upon a cleric.‖); Doe v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Rochester, 907 N.E.2d 683, 684 (N.Y. 2009) (following Marmelstein in reversing a lower 
court decision because the congregant made only bare allegations that the priest occupied a position of 
control or dominance and that she was uniquely vulnerable); Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop 
of S.F., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that priest accused of a sexual 
relationship with a congregant held not liable for the breach of fiduciary duty, because her ―claim of 
vulnerability rest[ed] solely on her ‗deeply religious nature‘‖ and determining how far she was 
“vulnerable to [the priest] and unable to protect herself effectively‖ presented ―profoundly religious 
questions, as to which the courts may not constitutionally inquire‖).  But see F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 
A.2d 697, 704 (N.J. 1997) (―Unlike an action for clergy malpractice, an action for breach of fiduciary 
duty does not require establishing a standard of care and its breach.  Establishing a fiduciary duty 
essentially requires proof that a parishioner trusted and sought counseling from the pastor. A violation of 
that trust constitutes a breach of the duty . . . .‖); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1989) (―[P]laintiff‘s claim for outrageous conduct is not premised on the mere fact that 
Christenson is a pastor, but on the fact that, because he was plaintiff’s pastor and counselor, a special 
relationship of trust and confidence developed.‖). 
 219. See Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401, 407 (Mass. 2009) (rejecting a claim of fiduciary duty, 
in part, because the religious relationship between the claimant and the church authorities ―provides no 
basis to support liability in a civil context‖). 
 220. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428–29 (7th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Franco v. Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 204 (Utah 2001). 
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as a religious leader or as a secular professional when the alleged 
injuries occurred.221  If a defendant acts in a religious capacity, no 
fiduciary duty should be imposed.222  But if a cleric holds himself or 
herself out as qualified to give professional secular counseling, courts 
have found that a fiduciary duty is owed when providing purely secular 
services.223 
2. Church Membership, Recruiting, and Ecclesiastical Discipline 
The church autonomy doctrine also produces easy answers where a 
tort claim is brought against a religious organization based on a person‘s 
removal from church membership.  Courts consistently reject such 
claims, reasoning that the ambit of constitutionally protected church 
autonomy includes the freedom to set and apply membership criteria 
without judicial supervision.224  Excommunication and other penalties 
related to church discipline are ecclesiastical and spiritual matters that 
lie beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.225  To hold otherwise would 
disregard the Supreme Court‘s repeated injunction that civil courts 
cannot adjudicate ―a matter which concerns . . . church discipline, 
ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the 
church to the standard of morals required of them.‖226  Judges and juries 
would, in effect, supplant ministers, priests, rabbis, and bishops in 
deciding how religious beliefs ought to translate into action and in 
 
 221. See Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex. 2007). 
 222. See Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting a 
claim of clergy malpractice because imposing a duty of care on pastoral counselors ―would necessarily 
be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of 
the religious entity‖); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986) (holding that ―adjudication of the present case would 
require the court to extensively investigate and evaluate religious tenets and doctrines‖ and that ―the first 
amendment precludes such an intrusive inquiry by the civil courts into religious matters‖). 
 223. See Marmelstein, 892 N.E.2d at 376, 379 (noting a cleric who is also a licensed professional 
may be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty ―under existing laws and secular standards that govern 
the practice of those professions‖); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 334, 338 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (holding First Amendment did not shield a minister from liability for damages arising from 
sexual affairs with two church employees when he had ―represented that he was qualified by education 
and experience to provide marriage counseling‖). 
 224. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc‘y, 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1997); O‘Connor 
v. Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d 361 (Haw. 1994); Marks v. Hartgerink, 528 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1995); 
Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 688 N.E.2d 923 (Mass. 1997); Smith v. 
Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2000); Conic v. Cobbins, 44 So. 2d 52 (Miss. 1950); 
Fowler v. Bailey, 844 P.2d 141 (Okla. 1992). 
 225. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 730 (1871).  ―We cannot decide who ought to be members 
of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly cut 
off from the body of the church.‖  Id. (quoting Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. 253, 258 (1842)). 
 226. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713–14 (1976) (quoting 
Watson, 80 U.S. at 733–34). 
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forming a religious organization‘s doctrines, governance, practices, 
discipline, and future development.  Courts have understandably 
rejected this course, acknowledging instead that churches enjoy 
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy from civil oversight to determine 
the eligibility of their members for purely ecclesiastical benefits, such as 
continuing membership and fellowship, participating in worship and 
ritual, or receiving sacraments—even if such determinations cause 
embarrassment or loss of social status.227 
Claims based on church recruitment should be similarly rejected 
unless a church‘s recruitment practices include secular deception or 
coercion.  Unless a religious institution engages in unlawful activity—
such as using illegal substances, threatening physical harm, or other 
criminal wrongdoing—to persuade people to join or contribute, tort law 
has no basis for deciding whether recruitment practices are tortious.228  
While a religious institution‘s practices could include actionable 
physical coercion, no tort claim should be permitted based on religious 
representations, such as that God would bless someone for joining or 
giving money to a church, or conversely, that God would curse someone 
for failing to do so.229  If the promised spiritual outcomes do not 
materialize, the member‘s quarrel lies with God and the religion 
generally, not with a legal action against the church.  In contrast, a cause 
of action may exist under narrow circumstances if a church uses purely 
secular (often financial) misrepresentations to recruit members.230  For 
example, a new member might bring a suit for fraud against a church 
 
 227. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 883–84 (holding First Amendment precludes a former Jehovah‘s 
Witness from recovering damages for injuries arising from the church practice of shunning former 
members); Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.3d 766, 775 (Okla. 1989) (finding that the First 
Amendment bars claims against church leaders for acts undertaken to discipline a member of the 
congregation); see also Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 
2002) (holding that public congregational meetings held by church leadership to discuss the homosexual 
relationship of a clergy member were not actionable as sexual harassment under federal civil rights laws 
because ―[T]hese statements were not purely secular disputes with third parties, but were part of an 
internal ecclesiastical dispute and dialogue protected by the First Amendment.‖).  But see Guinn, 775 
P.3d at 783 (holding that a former church member could bring a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress against church leaders who publicized her adultery in their congregations after she 
had withdrawn from church membership). 
 228. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (―Nothing we have said is intended 
even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds 
upon the public.‖); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (―[F]raudulent appeals may be made in 
the name of charity and religion . . . [and] be denounced as offenses and punished by law.‖). 
 229. See, e.g., Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996) (pastor‘s promises ―based not on 
statement of religious doctrine or belief‖ but were ―promises to perform particular acts‖ could be basis 
of fraud action); Hancock v. True Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last Days, 118 P.3d 
297, 300 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (refusing to adjudicate a religious promise in a suit for fraud). 
 230. See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Assoc. for the Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d 46, 
60 (Cal. 1988) (concluding that a religious organization could be held liable for fraudulent recruiting 
practices without offending the First Amendment). 
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that recruited him based on an intentionally false representation of a 
financial return in exchange for joining the organization and 
contributing his assets.  But such a claim would be available only when 
the misrepresentation is exclusively secular and not mixed with religious 
beliefs and claims; trying to adjudicate a claim of misrepresentation that 
is based, even in part, on religious facts—such as promises that God will 
make a person prosperous—would violate the principle of church 
autonomy. 
Third parties occasionally try to impute liability to a religious 
organization merely because a member committed a tort or crime, 
suggesting that a church has committed wrong by allowing a person to 
be a member or to participate in its rites and ceremonies.  Yet churches 
are not insurers or enforcers of their members‘ compliance with 
morality, much less the law.  Nor are churches secular endorsers of their 
members‘ good character.  By nature, religious institutions admit both 
saints and sinners.  Some have procedures for excommunicating 
ordinary members, whereas others lack even a doctrinal concept of 
excommunication.  Indeed, the very notion of ―membership‖ varies 
radically among faith communities.  In some faith traditions, ―a person 
may be a full participant in a church, fully aware of and actively 
engaged in all of its practices, without ever having become a formal 
church member.‖231  Other faiths ―do not include a concept of 
‗membership‘ at all, and do not require membership for adherents to 
participate in the faith‘s formalities and customs.‖232  Hence, nothing 
legal can or should be read into a church‘s decision to restrict, or not 
restrict, a parishioner‘s membership rights or access to worship services.  
A church, for example, does not endorse or ratify a member‘s tortuous 
or criminal misconduct by allowing him or her to continue in full 
fellowship or to participate in religious ceremonies.  Membership in a 
faith community or participation in its sacraments is a religious matter 
that should be legally meaningless.233 
3. Hiring or Retention of Clergy 
As the Supreme Court reiterated in Hosanna-Tabor,234 the selection 
of religious leadership is the sole prerogative of faith communities.  The 
Founding generation well understood from its own experience, as well 
as England‘s, that ―[t]he power to appoint and remove ministers and 
 
 231. Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Mich. 2000). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc‘y of N.Y., Inc., 738 A.2d 839, 848 (Me. 
1999). 
 234. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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other church officials is the power to control the church.‖235  It should, 
therefore, come as no surprise that the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from regulating ecclesiastical offices through a system of 
state licensing and that ―the Supreme Court has on a number of 
occasions ruled against efforts to overturn the judgment of a religious 
institution with respect to a selection for church office.‖236  Consistent 
with this ban on ministerial licensing, religious organizations have the 
constitutionally rooted autonomy ―to determine what the essential 
qualifications of [clergy] are and whether the candidate possesses 
them.‖237  The Supreme Court has held: 
By forbidding the ―establishment of religion‖ and guaranteeing the ―free 
exercise thereof,‖ the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal 
Government—unlike the English Crown—would have no role in filling 
ecclesiastical offices.  The Establishment Clause prevents the 
Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause 




Professor Laycock has further explained that ―[w]hen the state interferes 
with the autonomy of a church, and particularly when it interferes with 
the allocation of authority and influence within a church, it interferes 
with the very process of forming the religion as it will exist in the 
future.‖239 
Public policy considerations also weigh against any tort claim seeking 
to challenge a religious organization‘s choice of its own leadership.  
―The right to choose ministers is an important part of internal church 
governance and can be essential to the well-being of a church.‖240  
Safeguarding a faith community‘s autonomy over its future rests on 
several common sense reasons: 
Those in such positions are the authors of each faith community‘s 
 
 235. McConnell, supra note 47, at 2136. 
 236. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 217, at 1809, 1810 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 
(1929)); accord Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694; McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 
1972); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989); Bell v. Presbyterian 
Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist 
Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); First Eng. Lutheran Church of Okla. City v. Evangelical Lutheran 
Synod of Kan. & Adjacent States, 135 F.2d 701 (10th Cir. 1943); Equal Emp‘t Opportunity Comm‘n v. 
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1996); 
Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church of Wash., 553 S.E.2d 511 (Va. 2001). 
 237. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 19; accord Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 
1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999) (―The choice of individuals to serve as ministers is one of 
the most fundamental rights belonging to a religious institution.‖). 
 238. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703. 
 239. Laycock, supra note 5, at 1391. 
 240. Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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continuing vision.  They regulate its worship life, preside over changes in 
its liturgy and sense of values, and communicate its stories, beliefs, 
ethics, and sense of continuity from one generation to the next.  State 
interference with the selection of leaders thus implicates the religious 
community‘s method of transmitting its vision and cannot help but alter 
the content of the vision itself.
241
 
The church autonomy doctrine accordingly preserves for religious 
organizations the freedom to ―select their own leaders, define their own 
doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions.‖242 
Claims against churches for the wrongful hiring or retention of clerics 
may be brought by clerics themselves or by third parties.  Disappointed 
clergy members sometimes bring lawsuits on the ground that they were 
wrongfully denied employment or terminated.  These claims strike so 
close to the heart of a church‘s control of its own destiny that courts 
have found little trouble dismissing them.243  The same principles have 
led courts to dismiss federal discrimination claims brought by ministers 
against their churches.244  Both lines of decisions commonly find that a 
civil court has no standards or authority by which to second guess who a 
church selects or keeps to preach or spread the religion or to mediate 
between God and the faithful.  The First Amendment ―ensures that the 
authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a 
matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the church‘s alone.‖245 
The same First Amendment bar on adjudication applies to suits 
brought by current or former employees holding unordained offices and 
unpaid volunteers who perform spiritually significant functions within a 
church.246  An action for negligent hiring or retention should not lie 
 
 241. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 217, at 1809.  
 242. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341–342 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (quoting Laycock, supra note 5, at 1389). 
 243. See, e.g., United Methodist Church, Balt. Annual Conference v. White, 571 A.2d 790 (D.C. 
1990); Daniels v. Union Baptist Ass‘n, 55 P.3d 1012 (Okla. 2001).  The same reasoning holds true with 
respect to a religious institution‘s autonomy to decide whether a person should rise in the hierarchy or 
be dismissed.  In some jurisdictions there is a tort for wrongful termination.  But as regards churches, 
this is a zone where secular tort or labor-law standards for hiring and firing appropriate for private 
industry do not apply. 
 244. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694; Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307–
08 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 903 (2007) (dismissing a female chaplain‘s Title VII claims for 
gender discrimination and retaliation for opposing sexual harassment against a private Catholic 
university because the decision to restructure university leadership and demote her fell within the 
ministerial exception); Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(applying ministerial exception to a church leader‘s public announcement that a former worship director 
had been dismissed for homosexuality). 
 245. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 246. See id. at 707–709 (explaining that the ―nature of the religious functions performed,‖ such as 
―a role in conveying the Church‘s message and carrying out its mission‖ and an ―important role in 
transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation,‖ rather than a ―rigid formula,‖ determine 
ministerial status for purpose of the ministerial exception); Petruska, 462 F.3d at 307–08 (noting the 
40
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss2/6
2011] THE CHURCH AUTONOMY DOCTRINE 471 
against a church based on the actions of a volunteer responsible for 
selecting worship music or teaching Bible study.  By contrast, such a 
claim might well lie against a church where an employee or volunteer is 
engaged solely to perform secular functions, such as mowing the chapel 
lawn. 
Third parties have brought related claims against churches for 
negligent hiring or retention on the ground that the injuries inflicted by 
the cleric resulted from the church‘s management decisions.247  A cause 
of action for negligent hiring in the secular context is generally available 
when the employer knew or should have known of the risks to others in 
offering employment, a standard that in practice turns on the adequacy 
of pre-employment investigation.248  Similarly, a cause of action for 
negligent retention turns on the employer‘s duty to ensure that 
employees remain fit for their employment responsibilities.249  Because 
the decision to hire or retain a minister is so infused with religion and 
with a church‘s right of self-definition autonomy, courts have been 
similarly hostile to these claims when applied to churches.250  
Nevertheless, some division of opinion remains,251 which may be 
explained, at least in part, by a lack of understanding about the church 
autonomy doctrine and its effects on the correct application of common 
law tort doctrines.  The Supreme Court‘s decision in Hosanna-Tabor 
underscores the constitutional imperative of not interfering with a 
church‘s sole ―authority to select and control who will minister to the 
faithful,‖ whether by injunctive relief or money damages.252 
 
ministerial exception applies to the selection and retention of those who perform ―spiritual functions‖); 
Equal Emp‘t Opportunity Comm‘n v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 805 (4th Cir. 
2000) (―[T]he functions of the music ministry and music teaching positions in this case are integral to 
the spiritual and pastoral mission of Sacred Heart Cathedral.‖); Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 465 
(―[E]mployment as a tenured member of the Department of Canon Law so clearly meets the ministerial 
function test.‖); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 
1985) (noting the unordained office of associate in pastoral care ―so embodies the basic purpose of the 
religious institution that state scrutiny of the process for filling the position would raise constitutional 
problems‖). 
 247. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) (describing the employer‘s 
duty of reasonable care to prevent an employee‘s injuring others). 
 248. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 362 n.15 (Fla. 2002) (―Liability in these cases focuses 
on the adequacy of the employer‘s pre-employment investigation into the employee‘s background.‖). 
 249. See 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship §§ 475–76 (1996). 
 250. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995) (―[T]he First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the courts of this state from determining what 
makes one competent to serve as a Catholic priest since such a determination would require 
interpretation of church canons and internal church policies and practices.‖). 
 251. See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 360 (―We reject the contention that the First Amendment may be 
invoked to bar the adjudication of this dispute because this case is not an internal church matter.  Rather, 
this is a dispute between church officials and two parishioners who allege that they were injured as a 
result of the negligence of the church officials.‖). 
 252.  132 S. Ct. at 709. 
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4. Breach of Confidentiality 
Courts have long accorded a testimonial privilege for confidential 
communications between a religious leader and a church member under 
the heading of the ―priest–penitent privilege.‖  The Roman Catholic 
Church recognized the binding confidentiality of the confessional by at 
least the fifth century.253  English common law, with its history of state 
supremacy over religious affairs, appears to have been unsettled on 
whether a civil court could compel a cleric to violate that confidentiality 
when a priest came into possession of otherwise competent evidence.254  
But American legislatures and courts adopted the privilege early on,255 
and the Supreme Court acknowledged it in 1876.256  Today, ―[a]ll fifty 
states have enacted statutes granting some form of testimonial privilege 
to clergy-communicant communications‖257—generally by legislation 
and often by court rule as well—and it figures as a recognized element 
of federal procedure.258 
As the Supreme Court has explained, ―The priest–penitent privilege 
recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total 
and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts 
and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.‖259  The 
privilege reflects an aspect of the transcendent role played by religious 
organizations in the lives of their members to invite and facilitate 
personal guidance and direction.  Whether conceived of as a sacrament, 
 
 253. 26 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 5612 n. 47 (1992 & Supp. 2010). 
 254. Legal scholars disagree over the status of the priest-penitent privilege under English common 
law.  It is commonly asserted that the privilege did not exist after the Reformation.  See 8 JOHN H. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394, at 869 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (―But since the Restoration, 
and for more than two centuries of English practice, the almost unanimous expression of judicial 
opinion (including at least two decisive rulings) has denied the existence of [the priest–penitent] 
privilege.‖).  Substantial doubt is cast on that proposition by the authors of Federal Practice and 
Procedure who declare, however, that ―[t]he authority cited in support of this proposition is seldom 
impressive‖ and that the weight of historical evidence seems to be that the question ―‗has never been 
solemnly decided.‘‖  WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 253, at § 5612 (quoting JAMES FITZJAMES 
STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 171 (1876)). 
 255. See People v. Phillips, (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE 
CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA 109 (1813) (holding that ―upon the ground of the constitution, of the 
social compact, and of civil and religious liberty‖ a Catholic priest could not be compelled to disclose 
the identity of a thief, as revealed during confession). 
 256. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 104, 107 (1876) (―[S]uits cannot be maintained which 
would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional.‖). 
 257. Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532 (9th Cir. 1997); see also In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
 258. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 377 (―We further hold that this privilege 
protects communications to a member of the clergy, in his or her spiritual or professional capacity, by 
persons who seek spiritual counseling and who reasonably expect that their words will be kept in 
confidence.‖). 
 259. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 
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a component of individual repentance, or an effort to redirect one‘s life 
in conformity with religious conviction and commitment, the act of 
confessing wrong to a spiritual adviser and seeking his or her counsel is 
an indispensable element of many faith traditions.  Like other 
evidentiary privileges, the priest–penitent privilege is ―rooted in the 
imperative need for confidence and trust,‖260 on the understanding that a 
relationship of trust will tend to aid the spiritual and mental health of the 
religious institution‘s members and encourage complete candor with a 
person‘s spiritual adviser.  Under the privilege, conversations that occur 
when a person seeks out spiritual counseling or redemption are not 
discoverable in a court of law.261  The nature of the communication and 
the underlying relationship explain why the privilege has been construed 
broadly to include non-penitential communications with a religious 
leader responsible for pastoral counseling.262 
Yet despite the legal privilege, a confidential communication with 
clergy remains an inherently religious act.  Thus, courts typically refuse 
to allow tort claims against ministers for breaching the priest–penitent 
privilege, whether in or out of court.263  Courts reason that an 
ecclesiastical duty of confidentiality is not enforceable by courts, and 
that while the law recognizes the privilege, it does not impose a legal 
duty of confidentiality on ministers.264  As the New York Court of 
Appeals explained, ―statutory privileges are not themselves the sources 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033 (West 2010) (―[A] penitent, whether or not a party, has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a penitential communication if he 
or she claims the privilege.‖); FED. R. EVID. 501 (―[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, 
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they 
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience . . . .‖). 
 262. See, e.g., Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 952 (Utah 1994) (explaining that non-penitential 
communications to a Mormon bishop lay within the clergy–penitent privilege because ―[A] constricted 
interpretation of the privilege does not take into account the essential role that clergy in most churches 
perform in providing confidential counsel and advice to their communicants in helping them to abandon 
wrongful or harmful conduct, adopt higher standards of conduct, and reconcile themselves with others 
and God.‖); Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (―[I]t it matters not 
how and by whom the meeting was initiated . . . .  The fact is that they consulted a representative of their 
faith in the privacy of his study in the Synagogue with a view to reconciliation and restoring their 
marriage.‖). 
 263. See Lightman v. Flaum, 97 N.Y.2d 128, 137 (2001) (holding that the state statute according 
an evidentiary privilege for clergy–penitent communications ―does not give rise to a cause of action for 
breach of a fiduciary duty involving the disclosure of oral communications between a congregant and a 
cleric‖); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 264. See Barnett, 723 S.W.2d at 554 (―The tradition that a spiritual advisor does not divulge 
communications received in that capacity, moreover, evern if a tenet of ‗ministerial ethics‘ . . . describes 
a moral, not a legal duty.  In the absence of a legal duty, a breach of a moral duty does not suffice to 
invest tort liability.‖); Scott, 870 P.2d at 956 n.5 (explaining that the ―clergy privilege is merely a rule of 
evidence that protects certain communications from disclosure during litigation; it does not define a 
cleric‘s ethical obligations within his or her own religion‖). 
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of fiduciary duties but are merely reflections of the public policy of this 
State to proscribe the introduction into evidence of certain confidential 
information absent the permission of or waiver by a declarant.‖265  In 
short, a cleric‘s obligation to maintain confidences is a spiritual matter, 
not a legal one.  As with other religious practices, the law protects such 
communications but does not regulate them. 
Courts sometimes circumvent this prohibition on civil liability for a 
breach of clerical confidentiality by imposing secular duties of 
confidentiality on ministers who hold themselves out as having the skill 
and knowledge of a licensed or professional counselor.266  Except where 
the cleric was acting as a secular professional rather than a cleric, these 
decisions err by mistaking the source of a cleric‘s authority.  Unlike the 
members of other learned professions, religious leaders owe their 
authority and understanding of their duty of confidentiality to religious 
doctrine, polity, tradition, and ecclesiastical practice, not to secular 
education, skill, state licensing, or the law.267  A claim that a minister 
breached the confidentiality imposed on the clergy as a matter of 
religious duty is a thinly veiled claim for clergy malpractice that lies 
outside the jurisdiction of civil courts.  As explained previously, the 
more sound approach is to find that unless a minister is acting solely as a 
professional secular counselor or therapist and breaches a duty of 
confidentiality in that capacity, no claim lies for divulging confidential 
communications obtained during pastoral counseling.  Otherwise, courts 
will find themselves inevitably entangled in conflicts between the civil 
and religious duties of clergy who are licensed counselors.268 
5. Claims Grounded on a Church‘s Alleged Failure to Adhere to 
Ecclesiastical Standards 
Tort claims sometimes turn on allegations that a religious 
organization failed to follow its own doctrine, canon law, ecclesiastical 
standards, policies, or procedures.  Such claims often allege further that 
the plaintiff detrimentally relied on these doctrines and policies, and 
 
 265. Lightman, 97 N.Y.2d at 135. 
 266. See Barnes v. Outlaw, 937 P.2d 323, 328 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
 267. Lightman, 97 N.Y.2d at 136 (―[C]lerics are free to engage in religious activities without the 
State‘s permission, they are not subject to State-dictated educational prerequisites and, significantly, no 
comprehensive statutory scheme regulates the clergy–congregant spiritual counseling relationship.‖). 
 268. See Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 402 (Tex. 2007) (holding that the defendant 
cleric‘s ―dual roles‖ as ―secular counselor‖ and ―pastor‖ probably could not be distinguished, and that 
―Any civil liability that might attach for Westbrook‘s violation of a secular duty of confidentiality in this 
context would in effect impose a fine for his decision to follow the religious disciplinary procedures that 
his role as pastor required and have a concomitant chilling effect on churches‘ autonomy to manage 
their own affairs.‖). 
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thus was injured by the lack of compliance.  As with clergy malpractice 
claims, courts have tended to reject such ―church malpractice‖ claims 
out of hand, reasoning that such claims necessarily require civil courts to 
interpret and police ecclesiastical standards contrary to the First 
Amendment.269  These decisions recognize that civil courts have ―no 
authority to determine or enforce standards of religious conduct and 
duty.‖270  For example, in Milivojevich, the Supreme Court held that by 
inquiring into whether the Church had followed its own procedures, the 
Illinois Supreme Court had ―unconstitutionally undertaken the 
resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution 
the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical 
tribunals‖ of the Church.271  In sum, courts have generally agreed that 
tort liability cannot arise from religious doctrine, duties, or policies.272 
B. Tort Claims Where First Amendment Limitations Ought to Apply 
Not all tort claims have turned out to be easily reconciled in practice 
with the church autonomy doctrine.  Courts have sometimes found it 
confusing or unappealing to apply the First Amendment ―all the way 
down.‖  In this subpart, we discuss some of these claims, along with 
related issues of discovery and punitive damages.  Each issue illustrates 
the underappreciated truth that judge-made common law is no less 
subject to the constitutional limits of the church autonomy doctrine than 
any statute or regulation.273 
1. Negligent Training or Supervision of Spiritual Functionaries 
Aggrieved plaintiffs sometimes claim a church is liable for injuries 
 
 269. See In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) 
(determining that whether or not a church was ―negligent or misapplied church doctrine‖ when 
attempting to cast out demons from a young girl ―is not a justiciable controversy‖); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 
563 N.W.2d 434, 444 (Wis. 1997).  In Clauder, the court concluded that it could not adjudicate whether 
the church should have known of the defendant‘s propensity to engage in sexual affairs, reasoning that 
―[T]o examine the vow of celibacy, and the church‘s action or inaction when faced with an alleged 
violation, would excessively entangle the court in religious affairs, contrary to the First Amendment.‖  
563 N.W.2d at 444 (footnote omitted). 
 270. Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. Ct. App. 1994); see also Richelle L. v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop, 106 Cal. App. 4th 257 (2003) (A church ―ha[s] no greater civil duty based upon its 
religious tenets‖). 
 271. 426 U.S. 696 at 720. 
 272. See Clauder, 563 N.W.2d at 444 (―The vow of celibacy by clergy is a religious decision 
based upon religious belief; it does not create a duty.‖). 
 273. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (per curiam) (reversing a 
New York Court of Appeals judgment that adjudicated the right of a Russian Orthodox Patriarch to 
occupy a New York cathedral, solely because the church autonomy doctrine as enunciated in Kedroff 
prevailed over state common law). 
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inflicted by spiritual functionaries on the theory that the church 
negligently trained or supervised them.  Judicial decisions have been 
divided on these claims.274  The reasons for dismissing them are evident.  
Although ostensibly based on notions of secular duty, a claim that a 
church negligently supervised its own clergy intrudes into ecclesiastical 
matters: 
The imposition of secular duties and liability on the church [for negligent 
supervision of clergy] as a ‗principal‘ will infringe upon its right to 
determine the standards governing the relationship between the church, 
its bishop, and the parish priest . . . .  Because of the existence of these 
constitutionally protected beliefs governing ecclesiastical relationships, 




These constitutional difficulties stem from the nature of tort law 
itself.  Courts cannot determine whether a cleric or spiritual functionary 
was reasonably trained or supervised without a standard of care against 
which to measure a church‘s conduct.  Defining that standard runs into 
the same dilemma as in clergy malpractice: the alternatives are 
imposition of a uniform, state-created secular standard or a religion-
specific spiritual standard.  Either injects a court into the constitutionally 
prohibited area of religious self-governance.276 
Bringing a claim of negligent training against a church for the acts of 
its ministers raises particularly acute conflicts with the church autonomy 
doctrine.  A clergy‘s authority to act in religious matters depends on 
religious qualifications like congregational consent, priesthood lineage, 
ordination, and educational certification recognized by a particular 
denomination.  The authority assuredly does not depend on the state‘s 
permission, which is unlike other professions, such as medicine, where 
 
 274. Compare Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 791–92 (Wis. 1995) 
(―[T]he tort of negligent training or supervision cannot be successfully asserted in this case because it 
would require an inquiry into church laws, practices and policies.‖), and Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 332 
(holding that a pastor ―is not analogous to a common law employee‖ for purposes of adjudicating claims 
of negligent hiring or supervision, because those claims would raise ―First Amendment problems of 
entanglement‖ that ―might involve the Court in making sensitive judgments about the propriety of the 
Church Defendants‘ supervision in light of their religious beliefs‖), with Odenthal v. Minn. Conference 
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 657 N.W.2d 569, 575–76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the district 
court‘s subject matter jurisdiction over claims of negligent training and supervision brought against a 
church for marital counseling conducted by a pastor). 
 275. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997). 
 276. Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 790.  ―Negligence requires the court to create a ‗reasonable bishop‘ 
norm.  Beliefs in penance, admonition and reconciliation as a sacramental response to sin may be the 
point of attack by a challenger who wants a court to probe the tort-law reasonableness of the church‘s 
mercy toward the offender.‖  Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting James T. O‘Reilly & Joann M. Strasser, 
Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 31, 47 (1994)). 
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authority to practice is granted by statute.277  The training, education, 
and formation of clergy are ecclesiastical matters that touch on some of 
the most deeply sensitive aspects of religion.   Permitting a claim for 
negligent training effectively regulates church polity and internal 
organization contrary to the First Amendment, no less than if the 
legislature directly imposed educational and training requirements on 
priests, pastors, and rabbis by statute.  Both conflict with the church 
autonomy doctrine by permitting judges and juries to sit in judgment of 
religious organizations for the management of their own religious 
leaders. 
Claims of negligent supervision might lie against a religious 
organization under exceptional circumstances where incursions into 
church autonomy are limited.  In such circumstances, the Missouri 
Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Gibson v. Brewer278 supplies a 
constitutionally sensitive approach by distinguishing between ordinary 
negligent supervision and intentional failure to supervise.279 
Gibson involved claims against a Catholic diocese for negligently 
supervising a priest accused of abuse.280  The court discerned the critical 
flaw in bringing a negligence claim against a religious organization: 
―Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church‘s supervision of a cleric—
what the church ‗should know‘—requires inquiry into religious 
doctrine.‖281  Concluding that such an inquiry ―would create an 
excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement 
of one model of supervision,‖ the court declined to apply a claim of 
negligent supervision against the diocese for the priest‘s alleged 
misconduct.282 
The court sharply distinguished between the church‘s negligent acts 
and its intentional ones, noting that holding a religious organization 
liable for its intentional acts ―does not offend the First Amendment.‖283  
Such a claim exists if, according to the court: 
(1) [A] supervisor (or supervisors) exists (2) the supervisor (or 
 
 277. Lightman v. Flaum, 97 N.Y.2d 128, 136 (2001) (―[C]lerics are free to engage in religious 
activities without the State‘s permission, they are not subject to State-dictated educational prerequisites 
and, significantly, no comprehensive statutory scheme regulates the clergy–congregant spiritual 
counseling relationship.‖). 
 278. 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997). 
 279. The approach in Gibson, with its heightened intent rule, echoes the Supreme Court‘s 
approach in Sullivan to ―press autonomy‖ in libel cases involving public figures, which also imposed a 
heightened intent standard so as to preserve the press‘s freedom to ensure the free-flow of information 
and commentary.  See supra notes 168–175 and accompanying text (discussing Sullivan). 
 280. See Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 243, 247. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 247. 
 283. Id. at 248. 
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supervisors) knew that harm was certain or substantially certain to result, 
(3) the supervisor (or supervisors) disregarded this known risk, (4) the 
supervisor‘s inaction caused damage, and (5) the other requirements of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 are met.
284
 
The critical point is that § 317 requires actual knowledge.285  Because 
the victim and his parents in Gibson ―alleged that the Diocese knew that 
harm was certain or substantially certain to result from its failure to 
supervise [the priest],‖ the court reversed the trial court‘s dismissal and 
allowed the claim.286 
Gibson‘s distinction between negligent supervision and intentional 
failure to supervise in the face of actual knowledge of danger furnishes a 
constitutionally sensitive model for adjudicating such claims.  The 
approach permits relief in egregious cases involving failure-to-supervise 
a clerical employee known to pose a specific danger, while avoiding 
constitutionally prohibited inquiries into religious belief, church 
government, and what ecclesiastical leaders ―should have known‖ in the 
conduct of their religious duties. 
By contrast, applying a standard of constructive knowledge to 
churches in negligence cases carries several constitutional defects.  A 
standard of constructive knowledge would pressure churches to change 
their policies and polities—which arise from religious beliefs—to create 
supervisors over ordinary clerics.287  This approach would impose a de 
facto secular or ―reasonable church‖ standard for monitoring clergy as 
juries decided whether a church had constructive knowledge based on 
preconceived secular or majority-religion notions of how clergy should 
be supervised.  Further, a standard of constructive knowledge would 
strongly pressure churches to reject any person from ministry or 
ecclesiastical leadership who may have once been accused (perhaps 
unfairly) of wrongdoing, frustrating religious beliefs in repentance, 
forgiveness, and redemption.288  These concerns become all the more 
acute when faith communities rely heavily on volunteer lay ministers, 
drawn from ordinary members of the congregation, rather than on 
 
 284. Id. 
 285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) (requiring proof that the master 
―knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and knows or should know of 
the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control‖). 
 286. Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 248. 
 287. See id. at 248 (holding that a claim for intentional failure to supervise a cleric does not 
authorize a court to inquire ―whether or not a cleric should have a supervisor‖) (emphasis added). 
 288. See L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Wis. 1997).  The court found that ―due to this 
strong belief in redemption, a bishop may determine that a wayward priest can be sufficiently 
reprimanded through counseling and prayer.  If a court was asked to review such conduct to determine 
whether the bishop should have taken some other action, the court would directly entangle itself in the 
religious doctrines of faith, responsibility, and obedience.‖  Id. (citation omitted).  See also Pritzlaff v. 
Archdiocese of Milwauke, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995). 
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professional clerics. 
Serious practical obstacles stand in the way as well.  Holding a 
religious organization to its constructive/―should have known‖  
knowledge of the tortious propensities of leaders and members is wholly 
unrealistic.  Many denominations serve millions of members worldwide 
with tens of thousands of clerics.  Knowledge of a single person‘s 
actions typically cannot accurately or fairly be attributed to church 
leaders who, in fact, knew nothing about them, or who may have had, at 
best, incomplete or less than credible knowledge of the risks.  Imputing 
to such organizations constructive notice of the background and 
character of virtually every ministerial employee or volunteer, and then 
holding them liable for allegedly failing to adequately monitor them, 
would impose a crushing and unconstitutional burden on the exercise of 
religion. 
2. Vicarious Liability 
Claims of vicarious liability also have become a familiar item on the 
menu of tort claims against religious organizations.  A commonly 
alleged theory of recovery is that the church is vicariously liable for the 
injuries perpetrated by a cleric who conducted a sexual affair with or 
sexually abused a parishioner.  Such claims are antithetical to the 
common law and the church autonomy doctrine alike. 
The traditional common law rule for vicarious liability is that a 
―master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed 
while acting in the scope of their employment.‖289  Suits against 
churches that press a claim of vicarious liability tend to turn on whether 
the clergy‘s alleged wrongs fall within the scope of his or her 
employment.  Virtually all courts agree as a matter of law that sexual 
torts committed by clergy are outside the scope of employment.290  That 
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that essentially all religions strongly 
 
 289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958). 
 290. See, e.g., Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32 F.3d 
953, 960 (5th Cir. 1994) (―It would be hard to imagine a more difficult argument than that [the priest‘s] 
illicit sexual pursuits were somehow related to his duties as a priest or that they in any way furthered the 
interests of St. Rita‘s, his employer . . . given [his] vow of celibacy and the Catholic Church‘s 
unbending stand condemning homosexual relations . . . .‖); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 
(Colo. 1988) (―When a priest has sexual intercourse with a parishioner it is not part of the priest‘s duties 
nor customary within the business of the church.  Such conduct is contrary to the principles of 
Catholicism and is not incidental to the tasks assigned a priest by the diocese.  Under the facts of this 
case there is no basis for imputing vicarious liability to the diocese for the alleged conduct of 
Grabrian.‖); accord N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 599 n.30 (Okla. 1999) 
(collecting cases and stating that its ―survey of national jurisprudence reveals that the majority of 
jurisdictions considering the issue of sexual contact between an ecclesiastic officer and a parishioner 
have held that the act is outside the scope of employment as a matter of law‖). 
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condemn sexual misconduct and exploitation. 
An extreme minority of courts diverge.291  In Fearing v. Bucher,292 
the Oregon Supreme Court held that a man who had been sexually 
abused while a minor by his parish priest could bring a claim of 
vicarious liability against the Archdiocese of Portland.  The court 
acknowledged that the priest‘s ―alleged sexual assaults on plaintiff 
clearly were outside the scope of his employment.‖293  Nevertheless, the 
court reasoned that ―an employee‘s intentional tort rarely, if ever, will 
have been authorized expressly by the employer,‖ and that, therefore, it 
―virtually always will be necessary to look to the acts that led to the 
injury to determine if those acts were within the scope of 
employment.‖294  Armed with this broad definition of the scope of 
employment, the court had little trouble finding vicarious liability: 
A jury reasonably could infer that [the priest‘s] performance of his 
pastoral duties with respect to plaintiff and his family were a necessary 
precursor to the sexual abuse and that the assaults thus were a direct 




Fearing marked a dramatic expansion of vicarious liability in Oregon 
and a sharp departure from established law across the nation.  That 
result shifted the doctrinal focus away from the traditional analysis of 
whether the illegal or even criminal conduct itself occurred within the 
course and scope of employment to a much broader inquiry of whether a 
lawful relationship arose during the course and scope of employment 
that later facilitated the tortious conduct.  By the reasoning in Fearing, 
vicarious liability follows any act, however intentional or criminal and 
however remote in time and place from the hours of employment, if it 
was within the tortfeasor‘s employment responsibility to cultivate a 
personal relationship with an eventual victim.  Because notice and 
foreseeability are not required for vicarious liability claims, Oregon‘s 
aberrant approach effectively imposes a rule of strict liability on 
organizations whose employment activities include fostering close 
personal relationships, as if such organizations were engaged in 
inherently dangerous activities and thus liability must be imposed 
 
 291. See, e.g., Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163 (Or. 1999); Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, 657 N.W.2d 569, 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the denial of summary 
judgment on a claim of vicarious liability against a religious organization for the injuries allegedly 
caused when a cleric engaged in a sexual affair with a parishioner). 
 292. 977 P.2d at 1163. 
 293. Id. (emphasis added). 
 294. Id. at 1166 n.4. 
 295. Id. at 1168. 
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regardless of fault.296 
No sensible person doubts that tort law should recognize the 
wrongfulness of sexual abuse, but even that worthy end cannot justify 
arbitrarily expanding liability.  Employers—and especially religious 
employers—should not be deemed insurers against the private criminal 
conduct of their employees and volunteers.  At bottom, Fearing 
contradicts the bedrock common law rule that vicarious liability attaches 
to an employer only if the tortious acts themselves occurred within the 
course and scope of employment and that self-serving, criminal acts are 
outside the scope of employment as a matter of law.  The decision‘s 
disregard for the principles of duty and fault also stand in sharp contrast 
to the Supreme Court‘s measured interpretation of federal law‘s primary 
vehicle for enforcing federal civil rights against state and local 
government, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  However egregious the allegation, the 
Court has followed the rule that ―a municipality may not be held liable 
under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.‖297  Fearing 
essentially adopted the opposite rule that an employer is automatically 
liable, regardless of fault, even for the crimes of an employee if the 
employee‘s duties included cultivating a personal relationship with the 
plaintiff.  Nothing in ordinary common law principles justifies so 
unlimited an expansion of liability for employers such as churches, the 
YMCA, Boy Scouts, and even fast food restaurants where managers 
may be expected to cultivate warm relationships with teenage 
employees to enhance productivity. 
Fearing likewise collided with the church autonomy doctrine by 
effectively imposing strict liability on the religious relationship between 
a cleric and parishioners.  It is difficult to imagine a more direct 
incursion into ―matters of church government as well as those of faith 
and doctrine‖298 than to hold a church strictly liable for the 
unauthorized, unknown, and unexpected crimes of its ministerial 
employees and volunteers.  This highly punitive rule, specifically 
targeted at religious organizations, forces churches to choose between 
potentially ruinous liability and religious convictions concerning the 
necessity of personal ministry.  Churches cannot be held strictly liable 
for encouraging religious leaders to cultivate close personal 
relationships with parishioners without the forces of civil litigation 
compelling faith communities to rewrite, reshape, or in some cases 
terminate core religious practices.  In this regard, Fearing violated the 
 
 296. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (providing strict liability for sellers 
of inherently dangerous products). 
 297. Bd. of the Cnty. Comm‘rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 298. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
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constitutional right of faith communities to define themselves299 and 
freely exercise their respective religions, much as strict liability for libel 
claims against newspapers would violate the constitutional right of the 
press to establish diverse editorial voices in carrying out its vital 
functions. 
The rule that intentional torts and criminal acts lie outside the scope 
of an agency relationship is all the more compelling in the case of 
religious volunteers.  To an even greater extent than with clerical 
employees, sexual misconduct and other crimes by unpaid church 
volunteers fall outside the scope of any agency relationship.  Common 
law agency decisions have consistently held that the scope of an unpaid 
volunteer‘s agency is narrow.300  As with paid clergy, sexual misconduct 
lies far outside the limited scope of a church volunteer‘s agency.  
Indeed, intentional torts should seldom, if ever, qualify as within the 
scope of a church volunteer‘s agency.301  Religious organizations would 
face intolerable burdens if the law left any doubt that vicarious liability 
is limited to non-intentional torts committed within the precise scope of 
any alleged volunteer agency. 
3. Defining Religious Agents and Who Acts for the Church 
Adopting constructive notice as the standard in negligent training and 
supervision cases also rides roughshod over a church‘s right to define its 
agents‘ duties.302  Even inquiring into the ecclesiastical relationship 
 
 299. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (―Determining that certain activities are in 
furtherance of an organization‘s religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission should 
conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious community defines itself.‖).  As Professor Laycock 
has written, ―Deciding who will conduct the work of the church and how that work will be conducted is 
an essential part of the exercise of religion.‖  Laycock, supra note 5, at 1398. 
 300. Compare Baxter v. Morningside, Inc., 521 P.2d 946, 949 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding a 
charitable organization liable for injuries from a car accident caused by its volunteer whose agreement 
with the organization ―controll[ed] the time, destination and purpose of the trip‖), with Scottsdale 
Jaycees v. Superior Ct., 499 P.2d 185, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (refusing to hold a charitable 
organization liable for injuries from a car accident caused by its volunteer who was on his way to an 
organization meeting, because the drive was outside the scope of his employment).  But see Lourim v. 
Swensen, 977 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Or. 1999) (concluding that the Boy Scouts of America exercised 
sufficient control over a volunteer troop leader to be held vicariously liable for his sexual assaults on a 
teenage boy). 
 301. See Jeffrey E. v. Cent. Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) 
(concerning sexual abuse by Sunday school teacher); Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
12, (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (concerning sexual abuse by scoutmaster). 
 302. See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (―Insofar as concerns 
retention or supervision, the pastor of a Presbyterian Church is not analogous to a common law 
employee . . . .  The traditional denominations each have their own intricate principles of governance, as 
to which the state has no rights of visitation.‖).  But see C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of 
Yakima, 985 P.2d 262, 274 (Wash. 1999) (―[W]e find churches (and other religious organizations) 
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between a church and its functionaries to determine the existence and 
character of an agency relationship presents constitutional difficulties: 
When a civil court undertakes to compare the relationship between a 
religious institution and its clergy with the agency relationship of the 
business world, secular duties are necessarily introduced into the 
ecclesiastical relationship and the risk of constitutional violation is 
evident.  The exploration of the ecclesiastical relationship is itself 
problematic.  To determine the existence of an agency relationship based 
on actual authority, the trial court will most likely have to examine 




Incorrectly identifying or describing an agency relationship between a 
church and its membership or leaders also infringes on church 
autonomy.  Unpredictable liability can result when a court attributes an 
agency relationship to a person who is alleged to be an active member of 
the church but who has no actual authority from the hierarchical 
organization.  Such a result offends church autonomy, which secures to 
religious organizations the right to determine who has the authority to 
speak and act on its behalf.  Ecclesiastical-sounding titles can present 
additional traps for a court unfamiliar with their real significance within 
the faith.304  While titles such as ―called‖ and ―ordained‖ ministers can 
have great religious significance and may be associated with secular 
agency, when determining whether a person, in fact, has a legal agency 
relationship with a church for purposes of tort liability the court should 
defer to the religious organization‘s good faith representation of the 
meaning of religious titles and focus primarily on secular indicia of legal 
agency, such as employment and control over property or finances.  The 
mere fact that a church member follows the tenets of his or her faith or 
the encouragement of ecclesiastical leaders and engages in personal 
outreach to others within or outside the faith—such as by following the 
biblical injunction to visit the poor and afflicted or by sharing one‘s faith 
in the homes of others—does not make him or her a legal church agent.  
Persons who live their religion or evangelize for their faith do not by 
that fact alone become legal agents of their church for whose actions the 
church can be held liable.305 
 
subject to the same duties of reasonable care as would be imposed on any person or entity in selecting 
and supervising their workers, or protecting vulnerable persons within their custody, so as to prevent 
reasonably foreseeable harm.‖). 
 303. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 444 (Me. 1997).   
 304. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1, at 53 (―[B]ecause of the great variation in meaning 
among religions, religious titles alone are never an appropriate basis for creating a duty or imposing 
liability on a religious institution.‖). 
 305. See Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 298 (1988) (―[E]xtending liability to 
voluntary, noncommercial and noncustodial relationships is contrary to the trend in the Legislature to 
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4. Discovery 
Discovery orders directed against religious organizations often bristle 
with First Amendment issues.306  The Supreme Court identified the 
central problem with such orders in rejecting the NLRB‘s attempt to 
apply neutral principles of labor law to Catholic high schools: ―It is not 
only the conclusions that may be reached by the Board [in adjudicating 
such claims,] which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion 
Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and 
conclusions.‖307  Churches can hardly be said to possess their 
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy—a sphere of activity with 
―independence from secular control or manipulation‖308—if litigants can 
rummage through their most confidential and sacred matters in ordinary 
civil litigation. 
The unfortunate reality is that discovery requests too often operate as 
a weapon to coerce settlements, even for baseless claims.309  This 
phenomenon means that ―[t]he litigation process itself can be 
intimidating, especially to small or unpopular sects, and offensive to 
religious sensibilities.‖310  Discovery demands of churches are often 
overly broad by design.  The requests may extend to a church‘s financial 
records, in violation of its religious doctrine that members should pay 
tithes or offerings confidentially as an act of private faith and without 
regard to the financial need of the church;311 to its disciplinary files 
about instances of misconduct wholly unconnected to the parties and 
claims before the court, violating the privacy interests of every person 
whose information is disclosed and religious doctrines guaranteeing 
 
encourage private assistance efforts.‖). 
 306. See e.g., In re CFWC Religious Ministries, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 891, 892 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(―[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that compelled disclosure of the identities of members or 
contributors of an organization may have a chilling effect on those members or contributors as well as 
on the organization‘s own activity.‖). 
 307. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 308. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
 309. See, e.g., Doak v. Superior Ct., 65 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (―The threat of 
having to place a dollar value on one‘s assets and to disclose that valuation to strangers, may well serve 
as a powerful weapon to coerce a settlement which is not warranted by the facts of the case.‖); Rupert v. 
Sellers, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904, 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (noting financial discovery ―could constitute 
undue pressure on such defendants in such actions to compromise unwarranted claims‖). 
 310. Laycock, supra note 5, at 1411 (citing NLRB, 440 U.S. at 507–08). 
 311. See, e.g., Matthew 6:1 (King James) (―Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be 
seen of them: otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven.‖).  Moreover, because 
information spreads rapidly and can be easily accessed through the internet, and because religious 
organizations often conduct humanitarian, ministry, and missionary efforts in far-flung places 
throughout the world, compelling the disclosure of an international church‘s financial holdings also 
increases the risk of kidnapping for ransom and its associated threats of violence, torture, and murder for 
church leaders, members, and missionaries. 
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confidentiality for voluntary confessions; or to other sensitive 
information about a church‘s doctrinal development, sacred ceremonies, 
organizational structure, decision-making bodies, policies, and 
personnel.  Such requests can be enormously invasive, ―inject[ing] the 
civil courts into substantive ecclesiastical matters‖312 where even ―the 
very process of inquiry‖313 into the requested religious materials may 
compel a court to scrutinize what are intrinsically religious matters.  
Such intrusions can powerfully affect religious organizations.  Even the 
fear of discovery into the sacred inner workings of churches can cause 
them to alter their internal religious practices, policies, and procedures 
and their record keeping, disrupting the delicate process by which 
religious beliefs and doctrines are generated.314 
This is not to suggest that religious institutions should be wholly 
exempt from discovery, but rather that courts must carefully examine 
and refine discovery requests to balance the tension between providing 
plaintiffs with material information and intruding upon constitutional 
limits that protect church autonomy.  For example, if a cleric is alleged 
to have driven drunk and caused an accident while in the scope of 
employment, discovery into church receipts for alcohol purchases for 
that cleric would likely be a legitimate inquiry.  But, discovery into all 
alcohol expenditures for the church—including for sacramental use 
during congregational services—would go too far by unduly intruding 
into constitutionally protected religious traditions and practices.   
Likewise, discovery into sacred religious rites not open to the public is 
likely too invasive under almost any circumstance to be justified; such 
information should be deemed privileged under the First Amendment.  
With these considerations in mind, a number of courts have 
recognized315—and more should follow suit—that the church autonomy 
 
 312. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem‘l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
451 (1969). 
 313. NLRB, 440 U.S. at 502. 
 314. See id. at 449 (noting that when courts intrude into ecclesiastical matters ―the hazards are 
ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests 
in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern‖). 
 315. See, e.g., United Methodist Church, Balt. Annual Conference v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 792 
(D.C. 1990) (citing NLRB, 440 U.S. at 503) (―The First Amendment‘s Establishment Clause and Free 
Exercise Clause grant churches an immunity from civil discovery and trial under certain circumstances 
in order to avoid subjecting religious institutions to defending their religious beliefs and practices in a 
court of law.‖); Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 608 A.2d 218, 222 (N.J. 1992) 
(expressing concern that civil litigation against a religious institution not proceed ―unless the incidents 
of litigation—depositions, subpoenas, document discovery and the like—would not unconstitutionally 
disrupt the administration of the religious institution‖); Equal Emp‘t Opportunity Comm‘n v. 
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting the EEOC 
cannot force seminary to produce statistical report regarding its faculty or administration); see also 
Bollard v. Soc‘y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999) (―The limited nature of the inquiry, 
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doctrine shields religious organizations from discovery requests that 
would intrude too far into the internal workings of a church. 
5. Punitive damages 
Another phenomenon in civil litigation that requires consideration in 
light of the church autonomy doctrine is the all-too-familiar claim for 
punitive or exemplary damages.  These damages are intended not 
merely to augment compensatory damages but to punish the tortfeasor, 
deter others from committing the same wrongs, and encourage private 
litigation to vindicate legal rights.316  All three purposes of punitive 
damages may conflict with church autonomy protections when directed 
at churches and religious organizations, but the aims of punishment and 
deterrence are especially problematic.317 
Punitive damages serve to punish the tortfeasor, as a kind of quasi-
criminal penalty on egregiously wrongful conduct.318  When directed at 
churches and religious organizations, this power to punish can be the 
power to penalize religious belief.  A well-known case brought against 
the First Church of Christ, Scientist illustrates the problem.  In Lundman 
v. McKown,319 the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed an award of $9 
million in punitive damages against the church based on the death of a 
minor who was denied medical care for juvenile-onset diabetes.320  
Despite difficult facts and the importance of ensuring that minors 
receive proper medical attention, the court found the award 
unconstitutional for ―imposing punitive damages on a church to force it 
to abandon teaching its central tenet.‖321  The court further concluded 
that ―under these facts, the risk of intruding—through the mechanism of 
punitive damages—upon the forbidden field of religious freedom is 
 
combined with the ability of the district court to control discovery, can prevent a wide-ranging intrusion 
into sensitive religious matters.‖). 
 316. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 57–58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also 
Godberson v. Miller, 439 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Iowa 1989) (―Punishment, not compensation, is the goal [of 
punitive damages].‖); Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 122 (Kan. 1984). 
 317. Nor is the church autonomy doctrine alone in placing substantial limitations on the 
imposition of punitive damages.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (limiting 
recovery for private defamation claimants to compensation for actual injuries); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991) (assessing the amount of a punitive damages award to determine 
whether it was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Newport v. Fact 
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266, 267 (1981) (noting punitive damages unavailable against 
municipalities for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 318. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (describing punitive damages as ―quasi-criminal‖). 
 319. 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Lundman v. First Church of 
Christ, Scientist, 516 U.S. 1092 (1996). 
 320. Id. at 813. 
 321. Id. at 816. 
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simply too great.‖322 
The Lundman court discerned why ordering punitive damages against 
a church to penalize its religious teachings is so deeply violative of the 
Constitution: deterrence is not a valid policy objective when it amounts 
to deterring or punishing a religious belief.  As the Supreme Court 
stated, ―Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious 
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be 
restricted by law.‖323  Allowing private individuals to target religious 
beliefs or practices, such as Christian Science, with punitive damages 
authorized by state law transgresses the ―fundamental right of churches 
to ‗decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.‘‖324  Even an 
unfounded threat of punitive damages may ―improperly affect the way 
in which a religious organization carries out what it views as its 
religious mission‖ and have a ―potentially chilling[] effect upon the 
practices of religious groups.‖325 
Besides infringing on church autonomy, pursuing the twin aims of 
punishment and deterrence can transform punitive damages into an 
engine of religious persecution.  According to the Supreme Court, ―At a 
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law 
at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or 
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.‖326  
Logically, this principle applies with equal force to court judgments 
driven by plaintiffs seeking to punish a church and to legislative 
enactments pursuing the same end. 
Courts have generally understood that punitive damages have the 
power to cripple or destroy an institution and that churches are not the 
same as mere businesses or other secular entities.  That is why punitive 
damages may be assessed against a religious organization only under the 
most exceptional circumstances.327  For example, if a religion 
 
 322. Id. 
 323. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 324. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 462 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952)).  To the extent a religious practice exists that directly violates compelling state 
interests—such as the proverbial human sacrifice example—the state itself may of course use criminal 
law to punish and deter specific criminal acts.  See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 n.8 (1978) 
(noting that ―[T]he courts have sustained government prohibitions on handling venomous snakes or 
drinking poison, even as part of a religious ceremony.‖).  It is obviously not against the First 
Amendment to prosecute a murder.  But neither tort nor criminal law can be used to compel the 
abandonment of a belief or suppress religious speech about that belief. 
 325. See Rowe v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 326. Church of the Lukumi Babaulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993). 
 327. See Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 816; Bredberg v. Long, 778 F.2d 1285, 1290 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(applying remittitur to eliminate punitive damage awards against the personal assets of religious 
defendants).  But see Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Minn. 
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commanded its followers to intentionally harm others, destroy property, 
incite violence or otherwise commit criminal violations, and clergy 
actively participated and facilitated such acts, punitive damages could be 
appropriate.  However, where a religion directs its followers to engage 
in conduct that violates no law, yet may appear objectively contrary to 
the followers‘ best interests, such as in the Lundman case, courts should 
exercise restraint and not punish the religious institution. 
6. Institutional Negligence—Imposition of Broad Tort Duties on 
Religious Organizations 
Some plaintiffs have attempted to allege institutional negligence 
claims against churches.  The notion of institutional negligence 
originated in medical malpractice litigation, where courts reasoned that 
―hospitals have an independent duty to assume responsibility for the 
care of their patients,‖ a duty that requires hospitals ―to conform to the 
legal standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk.‖328  
Directed against churches, a claim for institutional negligence would 
seek to hold religious organizations liable for failing to adopt reasonable 
policies, procedures, or organizational structures to mitigate allegedly 
known risks.  The theory is that sexual abuse or financial frauds, in 
particular, are so prevalent within churches that they have a duty to 
implement heightened safety procedures; to deliver general warnings to 
their members about the danger of abusers or con artists within the faith 
community; and to reorder their internal policies, practices, and polity to 
guard members against such risks.  In such cases, the plaintiff generally 
does not allege that particular religious officials committed wrongs or 
breached duties that led to the plaintiff‘s injury, but rather that 
regardless of individual wrongdoing or even notice, the injury arose 
because the institution itself was negligently organized or negligently 
failed to adopt adequate policies and procedures.  This cause of action is 
thinly developed, yet is beginning to appear more frequently in 
litigation.  Only a pair of reported decisions raise a claim of institutional 
negligence in the context of religious organizations.329  But the 
 
Ct. App. 1982) (distinguishing Milivojevich and holding that an award of punitive damages against a 
church for negligently permitting a minor to be abused did not violate the Establishment Clause); 
Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 607–08 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1206 (1983) (permitting a punitive damages claim against a religious organization despite First 
Amendment objections). 
 328. Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 721, 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) 
(citations omitted). 
 329. See Doe v. Catholic Archbishop of Chi., 703 N.E.2d 413, 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (bringing a 
claim of institutional negligence against the Archbishop); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic 
Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967, 970 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) (quoting Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 
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implications of institutional negligence for the future of tort law and 
religious liberty are serious enough to merit detailed discussion. 
To the extent an institutional negligence claim alleges that a religious 
organization did not comply with some sort of ―generally accepted 
practice‖ within the broader religious community, it is merely a ―church 
malpractice‖ claim that fails for all the reasons discussed previously in 
the context of clergy malpractice.  Stated simply, the state cannot 
impose a reasonableness standard on religion.  To the extent it treats 
organized religion as something akin to an inherently dangerous activity, 
this standard finds no basis in tort law and likewise offends the 
Constitution.  An ―institutional negligence‖ claim is flatly invalid under 
the religion clauses of the First Amendment because it attacks a 
church‘s very structure: the way it operates as an institution; the manner 
in which ministers and volunteers are selected, supervised, and retained; 
and the reasonableness of church policies and procedures that are based 
on doctrine, scripture, canon law, and sacred tradition.  Insofar as the 
claim imposes special burdens on religious organizations as compared 
with analogous organizations, it is also discriminatory.  Therefore, as 
explained in greater detail below, courts should reject such claims. 
a. Common Law Defects 
A tort is traditionally defined in terms of a duty owed to a particular 
person and the breach of that duty.  Institutional negligence departs from 
this pattern by presuming a broad and undefined duty to be ―better‖ 
organized or to teach and supervise more ―effectively.‖  These duties are 
not attached to the defendant because of its knowing choices or fault in a 
particular situation or because of the special nature of the defendant‘s 
relationship with a particular plaintiff.  The breadth and vagueness of 
these alleged duties make institutional negligence little more than strict 
liability, contending that the organization should have had reasonable 
policies and that the policies by definition must not have been 
reasonable because someone was injured.  
In this sense, institutional negligence resembles the abstract 
 
450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (―Several courts have determined, however, that a claim of institutional 
negligence does not require any inquiry into religious doctrine or practice.  ‗Instead, review only 
requires the court to determine if the Church Defendants knew of [the minister‘s] inappropriate conduct, 
yet failed to protect third parties front him.  The court is simply applying secular standards to secular 
conduct which is permissible under First Amendment standards.‘‖); see also Samantha Kluxen 
LaBarbera, Note, Secrecy and Settlements: Is the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act Justified in Light 
of the Clergy Sexual Abuse Crisis?, 50 VILL. L. REV. 261, 282–83 (2005) (footnotes omitted) 
(―[V]icarious liability may be proper because ‗institutional negligence‘ has been a component of the 
clergy sexual abuse scandal. Scholars have concluded that the church‘s hierarchical and internal 
discipline structures contributed to an institutional approach that fueled the scandal.‖). 
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negligence claims against corporations in the premises liability context 
that courts uniformly reject as speculative because they essentially judge 
the defendant‘s conduct by what the plaintiff‘s expert considers ―good‖ 
or ―effective‖ security measures.330  Institutional negligence invites the 
same error by requiring an after-the-fact comparison between an 
organization‘s policies and practices and the policies recommended as 
―reasonable‖ by such an expert.  The comparison is speculative because 
it is almost always possible to contend that some policy different than 
the one in place would have prevented abuse or injury.  A claim of 
institutional negligence also seeks to hold churches responsible for 
failing to comply in the past with present standards.  In cases involving 
sexual abuse, churches are faulted in current litigation for not having 
sophisticated policies and procedures years or even decades before 
society and corporate institutions were even aware of the nature and 
scope of the problem.  Such an approach is inconsistent with common 
law tort analysis. 
b. Constitutional Objections and Practical Obstacles 
Institutional negligence also turns the church autonomy doctrine on 
its head in that, rather than eschewing the ―analysis or examination of 
ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling [civil] disputes,‖331 
institutional negligence makes such analysis and examination the crux 
of the claim.  Where the church autonomy doctrine recognizes that 
religious organizations have the constitutionally guaranteed ―power to 
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine,‖332 institutional 
negligence converts these prohibited ecclesiastical zones into the very 
subject matter of discovery and trial—indeed, the very basis of liability.  
It would be difficult to imagine a cause of action more perfectly 
designed to infringe on the First Amendment‘s guarantee of autonomy 
for religious organizations.  Such an action would invite multiple forms 
of infringement and raise a host of practical problems. 
For example, discovery requests would be fraught with First 
Amendment issues.  A claim for institutional negligence opens the door 
 
 330. See, e.g., Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Calif., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(rejecting as speculative claim that better security measures for the premises at USC would have 
prevented sexual assault; plaintiff ―must do more than simply critique a defendant‘s security measures 
or compare them to some abstract standard espoused by the plaintiff‘s security expert‖); Lopez v. 
McDonald‘s Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)  (rejecting abstract negligence claim based 
on mass murder at a McDonald‘s restaurant); Noble v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1985) (rejecting abstract negligence claim for assault after a baseball game). 
 331. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979). 
 332. Kedroff, 334 U.S. at 116. 
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to sweeping and intrusive discovery requests of leadership structures, 
organizational policies, and membership disciplinary files about 
instances of misconduct and abuse unrelated to the allegations in the 
pleading.  Legitimate questions of privacy for non-parties and 
production burdens on a church could be shrugged off as the 
unavoidable costs of hearing the claim on its merits.  But because the 
attack is aimed at a religious organization itself, the scope of discovery 
requests is potentially as wide as the organization‘s membership.  It 
could well include church records predating the alleged misconduct by 
decades and covering the entire state, nation, or world.  In casting a wide 
net, the effort would be to portray an entire faith community as 
inherently dangerous or tortious, even if the factual allegations are 
directed at less than a handful of people from a single congregation.  
Responsible documentation of misconduct and records designed to assist 
in preventing abuse or other risks in the future could be twisted into 
allegations that the organization knew it had a serious, systemic problem 
with misconduct and failed to act appropriately or engaged in a cover-
up.  A church‘s high level leadership may be targeted for disruptive 
depositions and interrogatories on the allegation that the organization 
and its top level leadership either willfully or negligently failed to take 
appropriate steps to protect the plaintiff and other similarly situated 
church members.  Discovery requests are prone to abuse by litigants 
who employ them to coerce settlements, however unjustified.  Poorly 
managed, they reflect the worst of our civil justice system in the form of 
scorched-earth tactics.  That institutional negligence practically requires 
such tactics to succeed ought to weigh heavily against its validity. 
Punitive damages would also be the natural product of institutional 
negligence claims.  Even if a defendant had no knowledge that a 
criminal perpetrator posed a risk of harm to a plaintiff, the claim would 
allow a plaintiff to argue that the defendant church knew criminal 
behavior was sometimes perpetrated by church members or was within 
the faith community and that the defendant organization failed to do 
enough to prevent injury, such as adopting different or better 
ecclesiastical policies and procedures.  As previously explained, courts 
routinely reject analogous arguments.  If clergy malpractice is no claim 
at all because it would require courts to inquire into religious polity, 
practice, or doctrine,333 it follows that institutional negligence should be 
uniformly rejected for the same reasons.  No church should have to 
 
 333. See Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988) (―Because of 
the differing theological views espoused by the myriad of religions in our state and practiced by church 
members, it would certainly be impractical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care 
on pastoral counselors. Such a duty would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of 
the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity.‖) (citations omitted). 
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prove that its religious organization, beliefs, and practices conform to 
the secular demands of the larger community or to some ―reasonable 
church‖ standard, and in any event, none of those religious matters 
validly establish legal duties.334 
In the end, recognizing a new cause of action for institutional 
negligence is not only deeply flawed, but unnecessary.  Other causes 
of action, well settled and consistent with the church autonomy 
doctrine, offer adequate recovery for victims of abuse or 
mistreatment by religious organizations and indirectly encourage 
greater vigilance against misconduct without directly punishing a church 
for its doctrines, polity, or ecclesiastical practices.  In addition to 
holding the particular actor civilly and criminally liable for conduct 
such as sexual abuse, the religious institution may be held civilly 
liable if it breached a duty arising out of ―a special relationship of 
custody or control‖ with the victim,335 so long as that relationship is 
independent from the religious status of the minister or other spiritual 
functionaries.  Claims for improper supervision or retention may also 
be available for injuries arising from sexual abuse when, as discussed 
above, a church has actual notice of its employee‘s history of sexual 
abuse or other actual knowledge such that the harm was certain or 
substantially certain to result.336  Established claims like these can 
provide a fair opportunity for abuse and other victims to recover for 
wrongs committed by religious organizations and the incentive for 
faith communities to find practical solutions within their own traditions 
to guard against such wrongs. 
C. Future Tort Claims Seeking to Expand Affirmative Duties 
A common flaw of several tort liability theories made against 
religious organizations, and particularly with regard to a claim for 
institutional negligence, is a misguided attempt to impose affirmative 
duties on churches in contradiction of ―the premise that there is no duty 
to rescue or help others.‖337  Courts generally follow the rule that ―the 
 
 334. See Roman Catholic Bishop v. Superior Ct., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 406 (1996) (―[T]he church 
had no greater civil duty based upon its religious tenets.‖). 
 335. See id. at 1564 (quoting Nally, 47 Cal.3d at 293). 
 336. Compare Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1997), and Mark K. v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that the church had 
negligently supervised and retained a priest ―by permitting him to have access to plaintiff in situations 
where there was a potential for sexual abuse, or at least failing to warn [the victim] of [his] known 
propensity for engaging in sexual conduct with boys‖ when the church ―had a more than adequate basis 
for being suspicious‖ of him), with Roman Catholic Bishop, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400 (holding that a 
victim of abuse could not prevail on her claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of a parish 
priest who abused her because the church lacked ―prior notice of the priest‘s unfitness‖). 
 337. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1, at 12. 
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mere fact that one individual knows that a third party is or could be 
dangerous to others does not make that individual responsible for 
controlling the third party or protecting others from the danger.‖338  The 
amount of effort or risk necessary to provide assistance is irrelevant, 
and, typically, no duty exists.  This rule is so strong a force in the legal 
system that it extends beyond tort law.  State and local governments 
have no affirmative duty to assist their citizens, even to prevent the 
denial of basic civil rights by private actors.339 
A major exception to this no duty to rescue rule occurs when a 
―special relationship‖ exists that imposes a duty for an actor to 
protect or assist another, or to control the conduct of third parties.340  
While the term ―special relationship‖ carries no independent legal 
significance,341 the law has developed to recognize a select group of 
relationships between two or more parties as requiring a duty of care 
where the traditional default ―no duty‖ rule would otherwise apply.342  
Courts impose these heightened duties because of ―the party‘s 
superior control to perceive and protect the more susceptible party 
from danger.‖343  Section 314A of the Second Restatement of Torts 
enumerates such special relationships: common carriers and their 
passengers; innkeepers and their guests; land possessors who 
lawfully hold their premises open to the public and land entrants; and 
custodians and those in their custody.344  This finite Restatement list 
has endured for nearly a half-century to provide straightforward 
liability rules. 
The newly developed Third Restatement of Torts, however, makes 
a significant departure from this well-settled law.345  In addition to 
 
 338. Id. at 19. 
 339. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989) (denying a claim for 
compensation against government officials that returned a child to the custody of his violent father, who 
afterward beat him until he suffered permanent brain damage: ―As a general matter, then, we conclude 
that a State‘s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a 
violation of the Due Process Clause.‖). 
 340. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). 
 341. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 40 cmt. h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 342. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(placing duty of care on landlord to take protective measures to prevent criminal acts from being 
perpetrated against tenants); Baker v. Fenneman & Brown Props., LLC, 793 N.E.2d 1203, 1206–10 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a restaurant owner owes an ill patron a duty of care); Wagenblast v. 
Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash. 1988) (finding that a school district 
owes a duty of care to students engaged in interscholastic sports). 
 343. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1, at 20. 
 344. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 345. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Reshaping the Traditional Limits 
of Affirmative Duties Under the Third Restatement of Torts, 44 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 319 (2011). 
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adding entirely new special relationships to the select list,346 Section 
40 of the new Restatement creates uncertainty in the law by opening 
the door for courts to find special relationships that have never before 
been recognized.  While the Second Restatement ―expresses no 
opinion as to whether there may not be other [special] relations‖ 
giving rise to an affirmative duty,347 the Third Restatement holds that 
―[t]he list of special relationships provided in this Section is not 
exclusive.‖348  Rather, the new Restatement states that, in addition to 
the new special relationships listed, courts are free to recognize 
others.  The Third Restatement even suggests that ―[o]ne likely 
candidate‖ is the relationship among family members.349 
No court has recognized a special relationship based solely on the 
ecclesiastical relationship between a church official and a congregant.350  
The reasons for such judicial reticence are evident.  Imposing a special 
relationship on every church official would create a duty to rescue, 
protect, or warn with a potentially limitless scope.  Additionally, such an 
imposition would, theoretically, apply to a church official‘s relationship 
with all church members, some of whom a cleric might have never met 
before.  A special relationship may be validly imposed on a church 
official or church only if sufficient reasons support the imposition of 
heightened duties based on purely secular factors that are independent of 
the ecclesiastical relationship.  A church official operating a bed and 
breakfast, for example, may be held to the heightened duties of a special 
relationship because the nonreligious nature of the relationship 
(innkeeper and guest) fits within the traditional enumerated special 
relationships.  In the absence of these other relationships, however, 
courts should not unilaterally recognize a new, potentially retroactive,351 
affirmative duty based upon an ecclesiastical relationship.  To do so 
would violate the First Amendment by intruding upon the internal 
ecclesiastical affairs of religious communities. 
In addition to these recent concerns, Section 38 of the Third 
 
 346. Section 40 specifically includes as a new special relationship the relationship between a 
school and its students and a landlord and its tenants.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40. 
 347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A caveat. 
 348. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 
cmt. o (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 349. Id. 
 350. See e.g., Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc‘y, 879 A.2d 1124, 1129 (N.H. 2005) (―We 
decline to hold that the fact of church membership or adherence to church doctrine by the plaintiff‘s 
creates a special relationship between the plaintiffs and [the church].‖); Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Soc‘y, 738 A.2d 839, 847 (Me. 1999) (―The creation of an amorphous common law duty on the 
part of a church or other voluntary organization requiring it to protect its members from each other 
would give rise to both unlimited liability and liability out of all proportion to culpability.‖). 
 351. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 345, at 348. 
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Restatement also presents particular difficulties for religious 
organizations.  It invites courts to infer affirmative duties from statutory 
text: ―When a statute requires an actor to act for the protection of 
another, the court may rely on the statute to decide that an affirmative 
duty exists and its scope.‖352  This broad ―black letter‖ rule did not exist 
in either of the prior Restatements and lacks support under existing case 
law.353  Remarkably, it empowers judges to recognize affirmative 
common law duties under statutory law where they have never before 
existed, without the support of case law or other authority, and where 
the legislature in no way intended for a common law affirmative duty to 
exist.354 
By this new Restatement rule, something such as a child abuse 
reporting statute could be fashioned into a private right of action in tort 
law despite the contrary holdings of most courts.355  Churches could 
become targets of wide-ranging lawsuits predicated on lawyers‘ 
interpretation of a statute notwithstanding the legislature‘s judgment 
about the appropriate statutory penalty for a violation.  The resulting 
threat of potential litigation could pressure churches into abandoning 
their own religious convictions to help those around them in order to 
avoid potential civil liability, contrary to the First Amendment‘s 
guarantee of autonomy to make that choice free of such pressure.356  
Section 38‘s potentially unbounded approach thus threatens to 
dramatically upset existing limits on tort duties, including constitutional 
limits placed by the church autonomy doctrine.357  Courts should, 
therefore, reject the overbroad approaches of the new Restatement and 
instead surgically design liability rules using the church autonomy 
doctrine as their guide.  
 
 352. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 38 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 353. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 345, at 334–35. 
 354. See id. 
 355. See id. at 335–36 (discussing Judge Richard Posner‘s ruling in Cuyler v. United States, 362 
F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2004), rejecting creation of affirmative duty via a child abuse reporting statute); 
see also Doe v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 98 P.3d 429, 432 n.7 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (declining to create a private right of action from the child abuse reporting statute 
because the legislature did not specifically provide it). 
 356. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343–44 (1987) (noting that ―the [faith] community‘s process of self-definition 
would be shaped in part by the prospects of litigation‖ and that the resulting pressure would ―create the 
danger of chilling religious activity‖). 
 357. Cf. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 349 (Alaska 1990).  In Samaritan 
Counseling, the court held that a counseling center could be held liable for the consensual sexual 
relationship between one of its pastoral counselors and a patient, in part, on the principle that vicarious 
liability serves ―‗to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third persons incident to 
carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefitted by the enterprise.‘‖  Id. 
(quoting Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972)). 
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D. Applying “Neutral Principles” to Tort Claims Against Religious 
Organizations. 
Plaintiffs rarely argue that the First Amendment has no application to 
tort claims against religious institutions.  They argue instead that 
common law torts are neutral laws of general applicability under Smith 
v. Employment Division,358 or they invoke language from Supreme 
Court church autonomy cases regarding the application of ―neutral 
principles‖ to religious organizations.359  Some courts, taking an 
improperly narrow view of the church autonomy doctrine, have held that 
if a tortious act was not motivated by religious doctrine then claims 
based on such conduct are not subject to the church autonomy 
doctrine.360  In this view, tort claims would only be barred by the church 
autonomy doctrine if, for example, the court were asked to decide which 
side in a lawsuit was correct in its interpretation of church doctrine.  
The assertion that Smith applies broadly to allow all claims against 
religious institutions so long as they are based on generally applicable 
law or neutral principles was soundly rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Hosanna-Tabor, as noted above.361   
Other courts have rightly recognized a distinction between 
adjudicating claims against religious organizations that are truly based 
on neutral principles, and those that require interpretation of doctrine, 
policy, and administration.  ―[A] church can be vicariously liable for the 
negligent operation of a vehicle by a pastor in the scope of 
employment,‖ and churches can be liable for negligence to a person 
―who slipped and fell on church premises.‖362  But ―[q]uestions of 
hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy . . . necessarily involve 
interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and administration,‖ and 
adjudication of such claims ―would result in an endorsement of religion 
by approving one model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of 
clergy‖ over another model when these are ―quintessentially religious‖ 
matters that the First Amendment ―commits exclusively‖ to the 
church.363  The mere fact that tortious conduct is not motivated by 
 
 358. Clark & Roggendorf, supra note 163 at 520–21. 
 359. See e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States, 393 U.S. at 449 (―And there are neutral 
principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without ‗establishing‘ 
churches to which property is awarded.‖). 
 360. See e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (applying ―neutral principles‖ to 
adjudicate claims of negligent hiring and supervision). 
 361. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (―Smith involved government regulation of only outward 
physical acts.  The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church 
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.‖). 
 362. Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997). 
 363. Id. at 246–47. 
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religious doctrine does not exempt the claim from the church autonomy 
doctrine. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The church autonomy doctrine should figure more prominently in 
formulating tort law claims against religious institutions.  This doctrine 
provides a unifying thread that connects tort law, constitutional law, and 
sound public policy in cases involving religious organizations.  In 
adjudicating such claims, too many courts stumble over matters that the 
First Amendment has reserved to religious authorities. 
This Article represents an effort to show how courts can employ the 
church autonomy doctrine to reach fair and consistent outcomes, and to 
give religious institutions notice of what conduct is expected of them so 
that they may avoid liability.  The Article has explained that the church 
autonomy doctrine produces easy answers for several kinds of claims 
against religious organizations: (1) claims for clergy malpractice or 
breach of fiduciary duty arising out of an exclusively religious 
relationship; (2) claims arising from church membership criteria or 
ecclesiastical discipline of church members (including excommunication 
or failure to excommunicate); (3) claims against churches by ministers 
or other clerics based on allegations of wrongful termination, 
discrimination, or breach of employment contracts for ministerial 
positions and claims by third parties against churches or church officials 
for the negligent hiring or termination of clergy; (4) claims that a clergy 
member violated his or her religious duty to maintain the confidentiality 
of a member‘s confession or other statement; and (5) claims based on a 
church‘s alleged failure to follow its own ecclesiastical standards or to 
conform to alleged standards of reasonableness for religious 
communities.  Each of these claims should fail because it requires a 
court to second guess the determinations of religious bodies or to 
adjudicate matters of religious doctrine, polity, or practice. 
Not all answers are easy, of course, but the doctrine of church 
autonomy goes a long way toward simplifying and clarifying where tort 
law‘s limits lie.  While claims of negligent training and supervision are 
commonly asserted in litigation, challenging a church‘s training and 
oversight of its spiritual functionaries poses a serious and unavoidable 
conflict with church autonomy.  The requirement of actual knowledge 
provides a clear, rational boundary between permissible liability for 
intentional failure to supervise and an invalid claim for negligent 
supervision.  In addition, vicarious liability cannot arise from purely 
ecclesiastical relationships; such claims should, contrary to the near 
strict-liability approach of Oregon law, retain traditional limits imposed 
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by course and scope of employment requirements.  Further, this Article 
has explained why discovery must not be so broad or intrusive as to 
bring into court the very matters protected from state control by the 
church autonomy doctrine and why punitive damages are seldom a 
legitimate remedy against a religious organization, given that the twin 
policy aims—punishment and deterrence—are often illegitimate in the 
religious context.  Finally, the novel cause of action for institutional 
negligence should be rejected, as it thoroughly contradicts the basic 
premises of tort law and the First Amendment. 
In surveying the outer edges of tort law, the constitutional guarantee 
of non-interference by civil authorities in ecclesiastical matters must be 
respected.  That autonomy erects a structural barrier between religious 
activities and civil power, preserving a space for churches to govern 
themselves where ―civil courts exercise no jurisdiction.‖364  Within that 
space, religious organizations may decide for themselves questions of 
religious faith and doctrine; disputes calling for adjudication of 
ecclesiastical structure or polity; the relationship between a religious 
organization and its clergy; and the standards by which church members 
are admitted, guided, disciplined, and expelled.365  The church autonomy 
doctrine prevents the state from controlling the church, just as other 
lines of Establishment Clause precedent prevent the church from 
controlling the state. 
These constitutional protections for religious freedom can and should 
place limits on tort law.  Limits of this kind are a familiar part of the 
law.  It is well recognized that First Amendment considerations of 
freedom of speech place limits on the law of libel and slander.  While a 
few legal commentators and plaintiffs‘ attorneys have argued that tort 
rules should be applied uniformly to all defendants, including religious 
institutions, courts have rejected such arguments in favor of a more 
nuanced approach that accounts for more values than only compensating 
the injured.  Sound common law adjudication starts with the recognition 
that tort law is not uniform in its scope and application of liability—
providing recovery to the injured is not the only value—and that tort law 
actions are just as much ―government action‖366 as direct regulation. 
Beyond the limits on government action embodied in the Free 
Exercise and Establishment of Religion clauses of the Constitution, tort 
 
 364. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713–14 (1976) (quoting Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733–34 (1871)).   
 365. See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 44–45. 
 366. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (per curiam).  In Kreshik, 
the Court held that ―It is not of moment that the State has here acted solely through its judicial branch, 
for, whether legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power which we are asked to 
scrutinize.‖  Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)) (citation omitted). 
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law itself should recognize that religious institutions are not mere 
businesses selling products or services.  They must have autonomy if 
religion and communities of faith are to survive and flourish.  Tort law 
needs to recognize that regardless of general forces that push to expand 
liability, religious organizations and faith communities are different 
from secular institutions both in their history and in their function.  
Their purposes and objectives differ from secular institutions; the roles 
they play in people‘s lives are fundamentally different.  The explicit and 
implicit contrast between religious organizations and government 
entities, commercial enterprises, professional associations, and even 
secular charities are facts to be recognized as tort law shapes the duties 
it imposes on religious institutions.  These differences between churches 
and other public or private institutions justify unique treatment in tort 
law.  As commentators have noted, ―Tort law rules and processes should 
not permit religious character alone to trigger the imposition of duties, 
nor should tort law effectively require religious entities to restructure 
themselves to satisfy a state-imposed vision of the ‗good‘ or well-
ordered religion.‖367 
*  * * 
At bottom, the church autonomy doctrine calls on judges to recognize 
constitutional limits on their jurisdiction over disputes that are 
fundamentally religious.  The Supreme Court long ago identified 
―matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine‖368 
as lying beyond the judicial ken.  The late Justice Mosk captured this 
sense of judicial limitations eloquently:  
This is not to deny that a court might be tempted to believe itself 
competent in at least some religious matters and under at least some 
circumstances.  Yet it must not yield.  The essence of religion is to go 
beyond the bounds of reason . . . .  Judges in our polity may not follow.
369
 
It is that sense of judicial modesty that holds the greatest promise for 
continuing to ensure that tort law remains consistent with our society‘s 
deep commitment to the principle of religious freedom and to the 
autonomy of churches to give form, meaning, and reality to that 
freedom. 
 
 367. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 217, at 1834. 
 368. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
 369. Smith v. Fair Emp‘t. & Hous. Comm‘n, 913 P.2d 909, 934 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted). 
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